This House Foreign Affairs Committee “Minority Staff Interim Report” from June of 2020 is error-ridden and internally-contradictory. That is understandable in part. At that point in history, there had yet to be an HHS Inspector General audit and report on Fauci beard “EcoHealth Alliance, Inc.”, and the COVID-19 pandemic was raging on. Few if any people were in a position to adequately support any investigative or research effort to arrive at the truth about the Wuhan bioweapons laboratory.
The recklessly-dangerous Wuhan gain-of-function experimentation was funded in part by Anthony Fauci, a New York non-profit named “EcoHealth Alliance, Inc.”, and Fauci’s own NIAID and NIH. (See Page 24 regarding the lab’s bioweapons origins). EcoHealth was the shell – the beard, if you will – through which the millions of dollars were routed by Fauci and his pals for hazardous gain-of-function bioresearch.
I am re-publishing this House report below, regardless of its defects. The report also reveals a lot about how Fauci and his entities funded the Wuhan bioweapons laboratory as of Year 2014. We are therein reminded that the U.S. claims to have paused gain-of-function research in late 2014:
What really happened? Fauci and his political hack cronies got played. They thought that they were getting a sneak-peak at what was really going on at the Wuhan bioweapons lab, and that was worth it to our intelligence community to the tune of millions of dollars. Yet all that really happened instead, is that the CCP absorbed Fauci’s and EcoHealth’s money, research, methodologies, engineering, and intel while deploying the artifice of international cooperation – only for the CCP to launch the lab-leaked deadly virus into the wild a few years later through outrageous Wuhan incompetence.
You will see below that, as of Page 5 of the report, the House Committee mistakenly seizes upon the bat guano theory – the Fauci-fostered fake news that the pandemic was caused by a “zoonotic spillover event”. Yet even at the time of the below House report’s issuance in June 2020, most who carefully reviewed the history and available evidence already knew that the bat “wetmarket” theory was preposterous – complete crafted fiction. We knew that the COVID-19 virus instead propagated due to a leak out of the Wuhan bioweapons lab – just as SARS had leaked out of Asian labs years earlier during the 2003 SARS pandemic. Little had changed in terms of laboratory security during the interceding 17 years.
By Page 23 of the below report, once the House Committee starts to analyze the role of the Wuhan bioweapons laboratory in the COVID-19 pandemic, the Committee puts forth the hypothesis that “SARS CoV-2 leaked from the [Wuhan bioweapons lab] through improperly handled material or infected staff”, and even introduces us to Ms. Shi Zhengli alias “Bat Woman”.
By Page 27 of the below report, you can read about how Anthony Fauci’s NIH and NIAID funded gain-of-function research at the Wuhan bioweapons lab through Fauci’s favorite New York non-profit, the sketchy “EcoHealth Alliance, Inc.”
A Senate Report will next follow. I am surprised that more individuals did not read these reports at the time back in 2020, much less share them on the Internet like this.
THE
ORIGINS OF THE COVID-19 GLOBAL PANDEMIC, INCLUDING THE ROLES OF THE CHINESE
COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS
COMMITTEE MINORITY STAFF INTERIM REPORT
LEAD
REPUBLICAN MICHAEL T. McCAUL
ONE
HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
The
Origins of the COVID-19 Global Pandemic Including the Roles of the Chinese
Communist Party and The World Health Organization
House
Foreign Affairs Committee Minority Staff Interim Report
One
Hundred Sixteenth Congress
JUNE
12, 2020
CONTENTS
Executive
Summary
Report
Preface 4
The
Early Stages of the Pandemic 5
The
Chinese Communist Party’s Cover-up 13
The
Wuhan Institute of Virology 23
World
Health Organization Missteps 29
Outstanding
Questions Regarding SARS-CoV-2 and COVID-19 36
Recommendations 38
Conclusion 42
Appendix 43
Timeline
of Key Events in the Chinese Communist Party’s Cover-up 43
Laboratory
Results shared by Dr. Ai Denoting a Positive Test for “SARS coronavirus” 45
Screenshot
of Dr. Li’s Messages Regarding Positive SARS Tests 46
Letter
Signed by Dr. Li Under Coercion from Wuhan Public Security Bureau 47
Annex
2 of the 2005 International Health Regulations 48
Letter
to World Health Organization Director-General Tedros on Outstanding Questions 49
Executive
Summary
During
the 2003 SARS pandemic, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) used its stranglehold
on journalists and dissidents in China to hide information and obfuscate the
source of the outbreak. CCP leaders failed to inform the World Health
Organization (WHO) about the virus for four months. In the wake of this
malfeasance, the world demanded reforms to the International Health Regulations
that govern how countries are required to handle public health emergencies.
Today, it has become clear that the CCP failed to heed these lessons. The
ongoing pandemic is a tragic second chapter to their mishandling of the 2003
SARS outbreak.
There
are still many unanswered questions as to the origins of SARS-CoV-2, the virus
that causes COVID-19, and the root of the global pandemic. Almost daily, new
information comes out of China and elsewhere showing the scale of CCP efforts
to hide and cover up the outbreak. This interim report is an effort to put the
information that is publicly available into context, define what questions
regarding the virus and the response are still outstanding, and provide
recommendations on how to improve the global response moving forward. This
report is focused on the early phases of the pandemic, prior to the declaration
of a Public Health Emergency of International Concern on January 30, 2020. It
will be updated and expanded in the weeks and months ahead, but certain facts
are established.
It
is beyond doubt that the CCP actively engaged in a cover-up designed to
obfuscate data, hide relevant public health information, and suppress doctors
and journalists who attempted to warn the world. They deliberately, and
repeatedly, disregarded their obligations under the 2005 International Health
Regulations (IHR). Senior CCP leaders, including CCP General Secretary Xi
Jinping, knew a pandemic was ongoing weeks before it was announced. By
responding in a transparent and responsible manner, the CCP could have
supported the global public health response and shared information with the
world about how to handle the virus. It is likely the ongoing pandemic could
have been prevented had they done so, saving hundreds of thousands of lives and
the world from an economic meltdown.
WHO
Director-General Tedros has responded to the CCP’s cover-up by praising the CCP
for their “transparency.” The WHO has repeatedly parroted CCP talking points
while ignoring conflicting information. Director-General Tedros’ full-throated
defense of the CCP’s response and embrace of their revisionist history, as well
as the impact of his actions on the global response, is incredibly concerning.
There remain many outstanding questions that require us to seriously examine
the WHO’s handling of COVID-19. However, it has become clear that the WHO also
failed to fulfill certain duties required by the IHR.
Reflecting
on what we have uncovered so far, the failures of the CCP to protect their
citizens and fulfill their obligations under international law have resulted in
disappeared journalists, a world seized by a public health emergency, and
hundreds of thousands of dead. As such, it is incumbent upon the United States
and likeminded WHO Member States to ensure the accountability and reforms
necessary to prevent the CCP’s malfeasance from giving rise to a third pandemic
originating from China during this century.
Interim
Minority Staff Report on SARS-CoV-2 and the COVID-19 Global Pandemic
Preface
The
world is currently in the grips of a global pandemic known as COVID-19. As of
June 10, 2020, there were more than 7.2 million confirmed cases1 in at least
177 countries.2
More
than 412,100 people have reportedly died due to the disease3,
which
is caused by a strain of coronavirus. First identified in 1968, coronaviruses
are a family of related RNA viruses known to cause illness in animals and
humans.4
Depending
on the strain, coronaviruses can cause a range of illnesses, from mild
infections like the common cold to deadly diseases like Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS). The
2019 coronavirus disease (COVID-19) is caused by a strain of coronavirus
similar to SARS-CoV, the strain that caused the 2003 SARS pandemic. This virus
has been designated SARS-CoV-2.
Based
on an examination of the early stages of the outbreak, efforts to conceal the
spread and novel nature of the virus, failures to share accurate information as
required by international law5,
and
the suppression of voices seeking to warn the world, the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) bears overwhelming responsibility for allowing a local outbreak to
become a global pandemic.
Senior
CCP leaders, including CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping, knew a pandemic was
occurring weeks before they warned the public. Research shows that the CCP
could have reduced the number of cases in China by up to 95%6, had it fulfilled
its obligations under international law and implemented a public health
response at an earlier date.7 The World Health Organization (WHO) enabled the
CCP cover-up by failing to investigate and publicize reports conflicting with
the official CCP narrative, while at the same time praising the CCP’s response.
In sum, the COVID-19 global pandemic could have been prevented if the CCP acted
in a transparent and responsible manner.
It
is highly relevant to the analysis of these events that at various points,
authorities in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have attempted to draw
distinctions between various elements of the PRC government, or assigned blame
to sub-national authorities. In the PRC, the CCP holds a complete monopoly on
power, including the ability of civil authorities to take action or
1 “COVID-19 Map.” Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource
Center, https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html
2 The New York Times. “Coronavirus Map: Tracking the
Global Outbreak.” The New York Times, 28 Jan. 2020,
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/world/coronavirus-maps.html
3 COVID-19 Map.
4 Wege, Helmut. “Coronavirus, Infection and
Immunity.” Encyclopedia of Immunology, Elsevier, 1998, 658–661. Crossref,
doi:10.1006/rwei.1999.0173.
5 The World Health Organization, INTERNATIONAL
HEALTH REGUALTIONS (2005),
https://www.who.int/ihr/publications/9789241580496/en/
6 Lai, Shengjie, et al. “Effect of Non-Pharmaceutical
Interventions for Containing the COVID-19 Outbreak in China.” MedRxiv, 2020,
doi:10.1101/2020.03.03.20029843.
7 Lai, Shengjie, et al. “Effect of
Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions for Containing the COVID-19 Outbreak in China.”
MedRxiv, 2020, doi:10.1101/2020.03.03.20029843.
transmit
information. A poignant example of this comes from a statement made by Zhou
Xianwang, who served as Mayor of Wuhan when the outbreak started. Zhou defended
his role in the cover-up, stating, “As a local government official, I could
disclose information only after being authorized.”8
Thus,
findings in this document relating to the responsibilities of the PRC as a
state identify the CCP as the entity that bears those responsibilities.
The
Early Stages of the Pandemic
It
is believed that sometime in early to mid-November 2019, a novel coronavirus
first infected humans in Wuhan, the capital of Hubei province in the central
region of the PRC. While currently unknown, the cause of this virus is believed
to likely be the result of a zoonotic spillover event.9
According
to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the intelligence
community shares the scientific community’s consensus that the virus is natural
and not genetically modified.10
This
virus, later named SARS-CoV-2, causes the illness known as COVID-19 and is the
root of the ongoing global pandemic. Currently, the earliest case identified by
PRC authorities can be traced back to November 17, 2019.11
In
the following weeks, between one to five new cases were reported daily.12
On
December 16, 2019, a 65-year-old man was admitted to Wuhan Central, a local
hospital, with a fever and infections in both lungs. He was treated with both
antibiotics and anti-flu medication, but his condition did not improve. It
would later be discovered that he worked at the Huanan Seafood Wholesale
Market.13
According
to public reports, in addition to seafood, vendors at the Huanan market sold a
variety of wild animals – at one point, approximately 120 live and dead wild
animals from 75 species were listed for sale.14
Among
these were civets, camels,15
and
potentially pangolins, all known to be capable of carrying various strains of
coronavirus. Over the next several weeks, hospitals across Wuhan reported
dozens of cases of the mystery illness. By December 20th, 60 people had
contracted the virus, including family members in close contact with Huanan
workers, but who did not have direct exposure to the market. This was an early
sign of human-to-human transmission. By December 25th, medical staff at two
different hospitals in Wuhan
8 “China Didn’t Warn Public of Likely Pandemic For 6
Key Days.” AP NEWS, 15 Jan. 2020,
https://apnews.com/68a9e1b91de4ffc166acd6012d82c2f9
9 Walsh, Bryan. “The Coronavirus Isn’t the First
Pandemic Triggered by Animal Spillover.” Axios, 7 May 2020,
www.axios.com/coronavirus-animal-human-health-spillover-bbe5d22e-5146-4858-ac89-39b6ffeaef6a.html
10 “Intelligence Community Statement on Origins of
COVID-19.” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 30 Apr. 2020,
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/item/2112-intelligence-community-statement-on-origins-of-covid-19
11 Ma, Josephine. “China’s First Confirmed Covid-19
Case Traced Back to November 17.” South China Morning Post, 13 Mar. 2020,
www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3074991/coronavirus-chinas-first-confirmed-covid-19-case-traced-back
12 Ibid.
13 Page, Jeremy, et al. “How It All Started: China’s
Early Coronavirus Missteps.” The Wall Street Journal, 6 Mar. 2020, www.wsj.com/articles/how-it-all-started-chinas-early-coronavirus-missteps-11583508932
14 Li, Peter J. “First Sars, now the Wuhan
coronavirus. Here’s why China should ban its wildlife trade forever.” South
China Morning Post, 29 Jan. 2020,
https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3047828/first-sars-now-wuhan-coronavirus-heres-why-china-should-ban-its
15 Perper, Rosie. “China Banned Live Animal Sales in
Wuhan, after a Food Market Selling Wolves and Civet Cats Was Linked to a Deadly
Virus.” Business Insider, 22 Jan. 2020,
www.businessinsider.com/wuhan-virus-china-bans-food-markets-selling-live-animals-wolves-2020-1
were
quarantined after contracting the virus, a second clear and early sign of
human-to-human transmission. 16
On
December 27th, hospitals and health officials in Wuhan were notified by a local
laboratory processing patient samples the disease was caused by a new strain of
coronavirus that was 87% genetically similar to SARS-CoV, the virus that caused
the 2003 SARS pandemic.17
During
that pandemic, the most important method of transmission was human-to-human. 18
When
coupled with transmissions among households and amongst healthcare staff, two
significant causes of new SARS cases in 2003,19
Wuhan
healthcare workers had reason to be concerned.
Later
that day, the Hubei Provincial Hospital of Integrated Chinese and Western
Medicine provided this information to the local branch of the Chinese Center
for Disease Control and Prevention (China CDC). By this point, at least 180
people were likely carrying the virus.20
Three
days later, Dr. Ai Fen, who ran the emergency department at Wuhan Central,
received the results of a laboratory test identifying the cause of the illness
as “SARS coronavirus.”21
Dr.
Ai alerted her supervisors and reported the results to the hospital’s
Department of Public Health. She then circled the positive result in pink and
sent the results and a video of lung scans to a classmate from medical school.
22
[Fig.
1 – Positive Laboratory Test for “SARS Coronavirus”]
16 Page.
17 Shih, Gerry, et al. “Early Missteps and State
Secrecy in China Probably Allowed the Coronavirus to Spread Farther and Faster.”
The Washington Post, 1 Feb. 2020,
www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/02/01/early-missteps-state-secrecy-china-likely-allowed-coronavirus-spread-farther-faster/
18 Low, Donald E. “Why SARS Will Not Return: a
Polemic.” CMAJ : Canadian Medical Association Journal = Journal De L’Association
Medicale Canadienne, Canadian Medical Association, 6 Jan. 2004,
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC305318/
19 Ibid.
20 Ma.
21 “Whistleblowing Doctor Missing after Criticizing
Beijing’s Coronavirus Censorship: Reporters without Borders.” RSF, 14 Apr.
2020,
www.rsf.org/en/news/whistleblowing-doctor-missing-after-criticizing-beijings-coronavirus-censorship
22 Ibid.
The
message found its way to Dr. Li Wenliang, another doctor at Wuhan Central, who
warned more than 100 of his former classmates via WeChat that “7 cases of SARS
have been confirmed”23
The
next day, on December 31st, Chinese media reports of an outbreak of atypical
pneumonia cases began to appear online. A machine translation of one such
report was posted on the website for the Program for Monitoring Emerging
Diseases (ProMED), a “U.S.-based open-access platform for early intelligence
about infectious disease outbreaks.”24
According
to Dr. Michael Ryan, the Executive Director of the WHO’s Health Emergencies
Program, this post on ProMED is how the WHO found out about the outbreak:
On
31st December information on our epidemic intelligence from open-source
platform partners, PRO-MED, was received indicating a signal of a cluster of
pneumonia cases in China. That was from open sources from Wuhan. On the same
day we had a request from health authorities in Taiwan and the message referred
to, news sources indicated at least seven atypical pneumonia cases reported in
Wuhan media… That request was sent immediately, on the same day, to our country
office for follow-up with Chinese authorities and on 1st January we formally
requested verification of the event under the [International Health
Regulations], which is a formal process beyond any informal verification which
requires a response and requires an interaction from the member state.25
WHO
headquarters in Geneva instructed the WHO China Country Office to seek
verification of these reports from the PRC’s government. Despite public
reporting to the contrary, the PRC never notified the WHO about the outbreak in
Wuhan.26
PRC
authorities also actively engaged in a cover-up designed to prevent the spread
of information related to patients testing positive for SARS and their
knowledge that the illnesses were caused by a coronavirus similar to SARS-CoV.
As discussed later in the report, this was in violation of Article 6 of the
International Health Regulations.
23 Lei, Ruipeng, and Renzong Qiu. “Chinese
Bioethicists: Silencing Doctor Impeded Early Control of Coronavirus.” The
Hastings Center, 19 Mar. 2020,
www.thehastingscenter.org/coronavirus-doctor-whistleblower/
24 Lawrence, Susan V. “COVID-19 and China: A
Chronology of Events (December 2019-January 2020).” Congressional Research
Service, The Library of Congress. 13 May 2020.
25 Remarks by Michael Ryan, Executive Director of
the WHO Health Emergencies Programme, at “COVID-19 Virtual Press Conference,”
April 20, 2020,
https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/transcripts/who-audio-emergencies-coronavirus-press-conference-20apr2020.pdf
26 Ibid.
[Fig.
2 – Excerpt from Dr. Li’s message confirming seven cases of SARS]
Instead,
the CCP took action to prevent the news from being shared. On December 31st,
the same day the WHO became aware of media reports about the outbreak, various
technology services in China began to censor key words related to the outbreak.
On YY, a live-streaming platform, this censorship included the phrases “unknown
Wuhan pneumonia” and “Wuhan Seafood Market.” WeChat also censored criticism of
the CCP, including “speculative and factual information related to the
epidemic, and neutral references to Chinese government efforts to handle the
outbreak that had been reported on state media.”27
On
the same day, in accordance with the 2005 International Health Regulations, an
official from the Taiwan Centers for Disease Control (Taiwan CDC) sent an email
to the WHO focal point, informing them of online reports from China concerning “at
least seven atypical pneumonia cases”28
in
Wuhan. According to the Taiwan CDC, the phrase “atypical pneumonia” is used in
China to refer to SARS.29
In
addition, the reference to “at least seven” is strikingly similar to Dr. Li’s
WeChat message referenced above. Taiwan’s email to the WHO also noted that sick
patients were being isolated for treatment, a sign of suspected human-to-human
transmission. The Taiwan CDC requested the WHO share with them any relevant
information. The only response from the WHO was a statement that Taiwan’s
concerns were forwarded to expert colleagues but would not be posted on their
internal website for the benefit of other Member States.30
Taiwan’s
government believed the evidence of human-to-human transmission to be so great
that on the same day they contacted the WHO, the Taiwanese instituted enhanced
27 Ruan, Lotus, et al. “Censored Contagion: How
Information on the Coronavirus Is Managed on Chinese Social Media.” The Citizen
Lab, 4 Mar. 2020,
https://citizenlab.ca/2020/03/censored-contagion-how-information-on-the-coronavirus-is-managed-on-chinese-social-media/
28 “The Facts Regarding Taiwan’s Email to Alert WHO
to Possible Danger of COVID-19.” Taiwan Centers for Disease Control, 11 Apr.
2020,
www.cdc.gov.tw/Category/ListContent/sOn2_m9QgxKqhZ7omgiz1A?uaid=PAD-lbwDHeN_bLa-viBOuw
29 Ibid.
30 Chen, Frank. “WHO ‘Refused to Act’ on Taiwan’s
Virus Alert.” Asia Times, 27 Mar. 2020,
https://asiatimes.com/2020/03/who-refused-to-act-on-taiwans-virus-alert/
border
control and quarantine measures “based on the assumption that human-to-human
transmission was in fact occurring.”31
January
2020
The
next day, January 1, 2020, CCP officials ordered the Huanan market to be closed
and sanitized, destroying forensic evidence that may have provided insight into
the origins of the outbreak. An official at the Hubei Provincial Health
Commission ordered gene sequencing companies and labs to stop testing and to
destroy patient samples. The following day, scientists at the Wuhan Institute
of Virology (WIV) completed genetic mapping of SARS-CoV-2 but did not publish
the data or inform the WHO.32
On
January 3, the National Health Commission issued a nationwide order similar to
the one put in place by Hubei Provincial Health Commission, requiring that
samples of the virus be destroyed. The CCP refused to acknowledge that it
issued this order until May 15, 2020.33
The
WHO did not make public its knowledge of the outbreak in Wuhan until January
4th, when it issued two tweets.34
On
the same day, Dr. Ho Pak-leung, the head of the University of Hong Kong’s
Centre for Infection, publicly warned that human-to-human transmission was
highly likely.35
Dr.
Ho stated that he believed it was already occurring in Wuhan, due to the rapid
increase in reported cases, and warned about a potential surge of cases during
the Spring Festival travel season.36
The
Spring Festival travel season lasts forty days; experts predicted approximately
3 billion trips in conjunction with the holiday.37
On
January 5th, a second lab in China, at a research institute in Shanghai,
informed China’s National Health Commission that it completely mapped the
genome of the virus and that it was similar to SARS-CoV.38
For
a second time , the CCP failed to notify the WHO that Chinese researchers had
identified the virus, sequenced its genome, and that it was a coronavirus
genetically similar to the virus responsible for the 2003 SARS pandemic.
Beginning
January 6th, the United States Center for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.
CDC) repeatedly contacted the PRC, offering to send a team of experts to assist
with their
31 Ibid.
32 Allen-Ebrahimian, Bethany. “Timeline: The Early
Days of China’s Coronavirus Outbreak and Cover-Up.” Axios, 18 Mar. 2020, www.axios.com/timeline-the-early-days-of-chinas-coronavirus-outbreak-and-cover-up-ee65211a-afb6-4641-97b8-353718a5faab.html
33 O’Connor, Tom. “China Acknowledges Destroying
Early Coronavirus Samples, Confirming U.S. Accusation.” Newsweek, 15 May 2020,
www.newsweek.com/china-acknowledges-destroying-early-coronavirus-samples-confirming-us-accusation-1504484
34 World Health Organization. “#China Has Reported
to WHO a Cluster of #Pneumonia Cases -with No Deaths- in Wuhan, Hubei Province
. Investigations Are Underway to Identify the Cause of This Illness.” Twitter,
4 Jan. 2020, www.twitter.com/WHO/status/1213523866703814656
35 Choi, Jimmy. “‘Wuhan Virus Probably Is Spreading
between People’.” RTHK, 4 Jan. 2020,
https://news.rthk.hk/rthk/en/component/k2/1500994-20200104.htm
36 Cheung, Elizabeth. “Hong Kong Activates ‘Serious
Response Level’ for Infectious Diseases as Wuhan Pneumonia Outbreak Escalates.”
Yahoo! News, 4 Jan. 2020,
https://sg.news.yahoo.com/hong-kong-activates-serious-response-004758495.html
37 Wong, Maggie Hiufu. “3 Billion Journeys: World’s
Biggest Human Migration Begins in China.” CNN, 10 Jan. 2020,
www.cnn.com/travel/article/chunyun-2020-lunar-new-year-travel-rush-china/index.html
38 Page.
response.39
The
CCP refused to allow the teams to enter the PRC. On January 7th, CCP General
Secretary Xi Jinping reportedly ordered officials to control the outbreak. His
personal involvement in this portion of the CCP’s response to the virus was not
disclosed until February.40
The
same day General Secretary Xi issued his order, the Wall Street Journal
reported the outbreak was caused by a novel coronavirus.41
Two
days later, the CCP publicly acknowledged the novel coronavirus as the cause of
the outbreak, but claimed “there is no evidence that the new virus is readily
spread by humans, which would make it particularly dangerous, and it has not
been tied to any deaths.” This announcement was 13 days after Wuhan hospital
officials informed CCP health authorities the virus responsible for the
outbreak was a coronavirus genetically similar to SARS-CoV.
The
first death related to the outbreak was reported in Chinese state media on
January 11th, as travelers from across China began to depart for the annual
Spring Festival travel season. As many as three billion trips were expected,
including millions abroad.42
The
same day, frustrated the CCP had not taken action in response to his January
5th warning, Shanghai Public Health Clinical Centre Professor Zhang Yongzhen
published his lab’s genomic sequencing data of SARS-CoV-2 on virological.org
and GenBank, an open access online database maintained by the National Center
for Biotechnology Information within the U.S. National Institutes of Health.
Hours
later, the CCP’s National Health Commission announced that it would provide the
WHO with the virus’ genomic sequencing. The next day, on January 12th, the CCP
closed the Shanghai lab for “rectification.”43 Meanwhile, the WIV published
online the full genomic sequence of the virus it previously completed ten days
prior on January 2nd and the CCP provided it to the WHO. It is likely that
Professor Zhang’s online publication is what forced the CCP to finally share
SARS-CoV-2’s genetic sequencing with the world.
On
January 13th, one day after the genomic sequence was transmitted to the WHO,
the first COVID-19 case outside of the PRC was reported in Thailand.44
On
January 14th, the Chief of WHO’s Emerging Disease Unit stated that “it is
possible there is limited human-to-human transmission…but it is very clear
right now that we have no sustained human-to-human transmissions.”45
The
WHO’s official Twitter account published a tweet the same day stating
39 Mcneil, Donald G., and Zolan Kanno-youngs. “C.D.C.
and W.H.O. Offers to Help China Have Been Ignored for Weeks.” The New York
Times, 7 Feb. 2020,
www.nytimes.com/2020/02/07/health/cdc-coronavirus-china.html
40 Page.
41 Khan, Natasha. “New Virus Discovered by Chinese
Scientists Investigating Pneumonia Outbreak.” The Wall Street Journal, 9 Jan.
2020, www.wsj.com/articles/new-virus-discovered-by-chinese-scientists-investigating-pneumonia-outbreak-11578485668?mod=article_inline
42 Wong, Maggie Hiufu. “3 Billion Journeys: World’s
Biggest Human Migration Begins in China.” CNN, 10 Jan. 2020,
www.cnn.com/travel/article/chunyun-2020-lunar-new-year-travel-rush-china/index.html
43 Pinghui, Zhuang. “Lab That First Shared
Coronavirus Sequence Closed for ‘Rectification’.” South China Morning Post, 28
Feb. 2020,
www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3052966/chinese-laboratory-first-shared-coronavirus-genome-world-ordered
44 Axios.
45 Nebehay, Stephanie. “WHO Says New China
Coronavirus Could Spread, Warns Hospitals Worldwide.” Reuters, 14 Jan. 2020,
www.reuters.com/article/us-china-health-pneumonia-who/who-says-new-china-coronavirus-could-spread-warns-hospitals-worldwide-idUSKBN1ZD16J
that
“Chinese authorities have found no clear evidence of human-to-human
transmission.”46
This
is despite the above-mentioned reports of healthcare workers contracting the
virus from patients, a warning regarding human-to-human transmission from
Taiwan, and the public announcement by Dr. Ho at the University of Hong Kong.
On
the same day that the WHO downplayed the risk of human-to-human transmission, a
teleconference of high-ranking CCP officials was convened, including General
Secretary Xi, Premier Li Keqiang, and Vice Premier Sun Chunlan. According to
internal CCP documents obtained by the Associated Press, Ma Xiaowei, the head
of China’s National Commission of Health, informed the CCP leadership that the
situation “changed significantly”47
with
the confirmation of the Thailand case. According to Ma’s memo, the CCP believed
“the risk of transmission and spread [was] high”48
due
to the upcoming Spring Festival travel season. Ma assessed that “all localities
must prepare for and respond to a pandemic.”49
In
response, the China CDC in Beijing triggered a significant health response. The
National Health Commission sent provincial health officials a 63-page
instruction manual on how to respond to the outbreak, including requiring
doctors and nurses to wear personal protective equipment. The instructions were
marked “internal” and “not to be publicly disclosed.”50
This
meeting, and the publication of guidelines by the National Health Commission,
is confirmed by the CCP’s official timeline of events.51
Regardless,
on January 17th the first new case since January 5th was announced, the day
after the annual sessions of the Wuhan and Hubei provincial legislative and
advisory bodies concluded. It should be noted that these political events began
on January 6th, likely indicating that announcements of new cases were
suspended in order to not disrupt a major CCP political meeting.52
The
next day, on January 18th, during this undisclosed public health response
period, 40,000 families attended potluck banquets across the city of Wuhan.53
On
January 20th, six days after he was warned about the possibility of a pandemic,
General Secretary Xi finally issued a public statement encouraging a strong
response. This was also the first time the National Health Commission issued a
statement confirming human-to-human
46 (WHO), World Health Organization. “Preliminary Investigations Conducted by the Chinese Authorities Have Found No Clear Evidence of Human-to-Human Transmission of the Novel #Coronavirus (2019-NCoV) Identified in #Wuhan, #China. Pic.twitter.com/Fnl5P877VG.” Twitter, 14 Jan. 2020, www.twitter.com/WHO/status/1217043229427761152?s=20
47 “China Didn’t Warn Public of Likely Pandemic For
6 Key Days.” AP NEWS, 15 Jan. 2020, https://apnews.com/68a9e1b91de4ffc166acd6012d82c2f9
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 “China Publishes Timeline on COVID-19 Information
Sharing, Int’l Cooperation.” Xinhua, 6 Apr. 2020,
www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-04/06/c_138951662.htm
52 “China Didn’t Warn Public of Likely Pandemic For
6 Key Days.” AP NEWS, 15 Jan. 2020,
https://apnews.com/68a9e1b91de4ffc166acd6012d82c2f9
53 The Star Online. “Wuhan Neighbourhood Sees
Infections after 40,000 Families Gather for Potluck.” The Star Online, 6 Feb.
2020, www.thestar.com.my/news/regional/2020/02/06/wuhan-neighbourhood-sees-infections-after-40000-families-gather-for-potluck
transmission
of the virus was occurring, despite warnings from local health officials to the
CCP a month prior.54
The
next day, the first case of COVID-19 in the United States was confirmed.
A
delegation of WHO experts from its China and Western Pacific regional offices
conducted a field mission to Wuhan on January 20th and 21st.55
Their
January 22nd report conceded there was evidence of human-to-human transmission
but cautioned that more analysis was needed.56
That
same day, the Director-General of the WHO, Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus,
convened the first meeting of the WHO Emergency Committee to discuss the
outbreak. After two days of discussion, the Emergency Committee was divided on
whether to declare a Public Health Emergency of International Concern
(PHEIC).57
As
Director-General, the decision rested with Dr. Tedros, who decided not to
declare a PHEIC, stating, “This is an emergency in China, but it has not yet
become a global health emergency. At this time, there is no evidence of
human-to-human transmission outside China.”58
Again,
this was despite confirmed cases outside of the PRC, cases among healthcare
staff within the PRC, and warnings from Taiwan and the University of Hong Kong
that human-to-human transmission was occurring.
On
the same day Director-General Tedros chose not to declare a PHEIC, the CCP
implemented a city wide quarantine in Wuhan, halting all public transportation
in and out of the city.59
However,
due to the decision being delayed, an estimated five million people had already
left Wuhan in the days and weeks prior.60
The
CCP later suspended group travel abroad but allowed individuals to travel even
though, according to the Nikkei Asian Review, “groups account for less than
half of all Chinese tourists heading abroad.”61
The
announcement came seventeen days62
after
massive outbound traffic for the Spring Festival began.63
Over
the course
54 Wang, Yanan. “Human-to-Human Transmission
Confirmed in China Coronavirus.” AP NEWS, 20 Jan. 2020.
https://apnews.com/14d7dcffa205d9022fa9ea593bb2a8c5
55 “Mission Summary: WHO Field Visit to Wuhan, China
20-21 January 2020.” World Health Organization,
www.who.int/china/news/detail/22-01-2020-field-visit-wuhan-china-jan-2020
56 “Mission Summary: WHO Field Visit to Wuhan, China
20-21 January 2020.” World Health Organization, 22 Jan. 2020,
www.who.int/china/news/detail/22-01-2020-field-visit-wuhan-china-jan-2020
57 “Statement on the Meeting of the International
Health Regulations (2005) Emergency Committee Regarding the Outbreak of Novel
Coronavirus 2019 (n-CoV) on 23 January 2020.” World Health Organization, 23
Jan. 2020,
www.who.int/news-room/detail/23-01-2020-statement-on-the-meeting-of-the-international-health-regulations-(2005)-emergency-committee-regarding-the-outbreak-of-novel-coronavirus-(2019-ncov)
58 “WHO Director-General’s Statement on the Advice
of the IHR Emergency Committee on Novel
Coronavirus.” World Health Organization, 23 Jan.
2020,
www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-statement-on-the-advice-of-the-ihr-emergency-committee-on-novel-coronavirus
59 Nakazawa, Katsuji. “China’s Inaction for 3 Days
in January at Root of Pandemic.” Nikkei Asian Review, 18 Mar. 2020,
https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/China-up-close/China-s-inaction-for-3-days-in-January-at-root-of-pandemic
60 “Where Did They Go? Millions Left Wuhan Before
Quarantine.” Voice of America, 9 Feb. 2020,
www.voanews.com/science-health/coronavirus-outbreak/where-did-they-go-millions-left-wuhan-quarantine
61 Nakazawa.
62 Ibid.
63 “China Focus: China’s Mass Transit in High Gear
as Spring Festival Travel Rush Starts.” Xinhua, 10 Jan. 2020,
www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-01/10/c_138694671.htm
of
the next several days, France,64
Australia,65
and
Canada66
reported
their first confirmed cases of COVID-19. On January 28th, Director-General
Tedros traveled to Beijing as part of a WHO mission. He one again praised the
CCP’s handling of the outbreak, citing the “transparency they have
demonstrated, including sharing data and genetic sequence of the virus.”67
Nowhere
in his comments did Director-General Tedros note that this information was only
shared after it was leaked online by a Chinese researcher who was then punished
as part of the CCP’s cover-up.
Two
days later, on January 30th, Director-General Tedros reconvened the Emergency
Committee and, based on their recommendation, declared a PHEIC. At this point,
there were nearly 10,000 confirmed COVID-19 cases, including 83 cases in 18
countries outside of the PRC. Three countries had already confirmed
human-to-human transmission within their borders.68
The
same day, the first case of human-to-human transmission in the United States
was confirmed.69
Director-General
Tedros would not declare COVID-19 a global pandemic until March 11th, 41 days
later.70
The
Chinese Communist Party’s Cover-up
From
the early stages of the pandemic, the CCP repeatedly acted to conceal vital
information about the virus.
The
timeline above notes several examples:
-The
failure of the CCP to notify the WHO about the outbreak of a novel disease
within their borders.
-The
repeated failure of the CCP to notify the WHO of cases meeting the WHO
definition of SARS.
-The
decision not to immediately publish the WIV’s completed genetic mapping of SARS-CoV-2,
the virus that causes COVID-19, which would have shown its similarity to
SARS-CoV and confirmed it to be a novel coronavirus.
-The
shuttering of the Shanghai lab that published the SARS-CoV-2 genome online.
64 “France Confirms First Three Cases of Wuhan
Coronavirus in Europe.” France 24, 24 Jan. 2020,
www.france24.com/en/20200124-france-confirms-first-two-cases-of-wuhan-coronavirus-china-bordeaux-paris
65 “Chief Medical Officer’s Update on Novel
Coronavirus.” Australian Government Department of Health, 25 Jan. 2020,
www.health.gov.au/news/chief-medical-officers-update-on-novel-coronavirus-2
66 Vieira, Paul. “Canadian Health Authorities Report
‘Presumptive’ Case of Coronavirus.” The Wall Street Journal, 26 Jan. 2020,
www.wsj.com/articles/canadian-health-authorities-report-presumptive-case-of-coronavirus-11579998212
67 “WHO, China Leaders Discuss Next Steps in Battle
against Coronavirus Outbreak.” World Health Organization,
www.who.int/news-room/detail/28-01-2020-who-china-leaders-discuss-next-steps-in-battle-against-coronavirus-outbreak
68 “Statement on the Second Meeting of the
International Health Regulations (2005) Emergency Committee Regarding the
Outbreak of Novel Coronavirus (2019-NCoV).” World Health Organization, 30 Jan.
2020,
www.who.int/news-room/detail/30-01-2020-statement-on-the-second-meeting-of-the-international-health-regulations-(2005)-emergency-committee-regarding-the-outbreak-of-novel-coronavirus-(2019-ncov)
69 “CDC Confirms Person-to-Person Spread of New
Coronavirus in the United States.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
30 Jan. 2020, www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/p0130-coronavirus-spread.html
70 “WHO Director-General’s Opening Remarks at the
Media Briefing on COVID-19 - 11 March 2020.” World Health Organization, 11 Mar.
2020,
www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19 11-march-2020
-The
lack of new case announcements during CCP political meetings between January
6th and January 17th.
-The
suppression of reports from medical doctors providing evidence of
human-to-human transmission.
-The
six days of undisclosed response during January, during which General Secretary
Xi and other senior CCP officials kept secret their knowledge that
human-to-human transmission was occurring and that a pandemic was likely.
In
addition to what has already been covered in this report, there are a multitude
of additional examples of the CCP’s efforts to obfuscate, hide, and suppress
information. Despite repeated requests, the CCP has refused to share PRC virus
samples with the international community. Of note, on January 24th, CCP
officials in Beijing prevented the WIV from sharing virus samples with a
biosafety lab at the University of Texas medical branch in Galveston after the
WIV had already agreed to share the samples.71
CCP
propagandists have also sought to sow disinformation and shift the blame away
from their cover-up. As countries began to restrict travel, the CCP publicly
and privately criticized them. In mid-February, the CCP revoked press
credentials from Western news outlets that were actively covering the
outbreak.72
On
at least two occasions, CCP officials sent requests to State Senator Roger
Roth, the president of the Wisconsin Senate, asking that the Senate pass a
resolution praising the PRC’s response to the pandemic.73
Germany
has reported that similar requests were made within their borders by Chinese
diplomats.74
CCP
officials in the PRC’s Foreign Ministry have also made unsubstantiated claims
that the virus may have originated outside of the PRC.75
Lijian
Zhao, an official within the ministry, shared an article on Twitter that
claimed that the virus was brought to the PRC by the U.S. military.76
The
article was from globalresearch.ca, a website that pushes pro-Putin propaganda
and has reported ties to Russian state media.77
His
tweet was amplified by the Chinese Embassy
71 Abutaleb, Yasmeen, et al. “The U.S. Was Beset by
Denial and Dysfunction as the Coronavirus Raged.” The Washington Post, 4 Apr.
2020,
www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2020/04/04/coronavirus-government-dysfunction/?arc404=true
72 “China Expels Three Wall Street Journal
Reporters.” The Wall Street Journal, 19 Feb. 2020, www.wsj.com/articles/china-expels-three-wall-street-journal-reporters-11582100355
73 Wong, Edward, and Paul Mozur. “China’s ‘Donation
Diplomacy’ Raises Tensions with U.S.” The New York Times, 14 Apr. 2020,
www.nytimes.com/2020/04/14/us/politics/coronavirus-china-trump-donation.html
74 “Germany Says China Sought to Encourage Positive
COVID-19 Comments.” The New York Times, 27 Apr. 2020,
www.nytimes.com/reuters/2020/04/27/world/europe/27reuters-health-coronavirus-germany-china.html
75 “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian’s
Regular Press Conference on March 4, 2020.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
People’s Republic of China, 4 Mar. 2020,
www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1752172.shtml
76 Zhao, Lijian. “This Article Is Very Much
Important to Each and Every One of Us. Please Read and Retweet It. COVID-19:
Further Evidence That the Virus Originated in the US. Https://T.co/LPanIo40MR.”
Twitter, 13 Mar. 2020, www.twitter.com/zlj517/status/1238269193427906560
77 Thomas, Elise, and Aspi. “Chinese Diplomats and
Western Fringe Media Outlets Push the Same Coronavirus Conspiracies.” The
Strategist, 30 Mar. 2020,
www.aspistrategist.org.au/chinese-diplomats-and-western-fringe-media-outlets-push-the-same-coronavirus-conspiracies/
in
South Africa.78 In late March, CCP state media shifted their story again,
publicizing a narrative that implied the virus originated in Italy.79
Fig.
3 –Zhao Lijian tweet from March 12, 2020
Perhaps
most critically, the CCP manipulated case statistics throughout the outbreak in
an effort to minimize the significance of the spread of SARS-CoV-2 and the
corresponding number of cases of COVID-19. From the beginning, the CCP only
allowed some symptomatic cases to be reported. Prior to mid-February, the CCP
only reported cases that were symptomatic, clinically diagnosed, and confirmed
by laboratory tests. On February 13th, this standard was relaxed in Hubei
province for those unable to get a test or still waiting on results. After this
change in policy, the CCP reported 14,840 new cases in one day.80
On
March 22nd, reports emerged that classified CCP data showed that by the end of
February some 43,000 asymptomatic people in China had tested positive for the
virus, representing one-third of all cases.81
It
was not until March 31st, after reports surfaced that CCP guidelines prevented
asymptomatic cases from being included in the number of confirmed cases, that
this policy was reversed.82
In
late March, Wuhan residents told Radio Free Asia the CCP’s official death toll
of 2,500 was impossibly low. The reporting indicated the Hankou Funeral Home
received a shipment of 5,000 new urns from a supplier in a single day. Seven
large funeral homes in Wuhan were reportedly returning the cremated remains of
approximately 500 people to their families each
78 Chinese Embassy in South Africa. “More Evidence
Suggests That the Virus Was Not Originated at the Seafood Market in Wuhan at
All, Not to Mention the so Called ‘Made in China’. Https://T.co/8cRxkSZB3z.”
Twitter, 16 Mar. 2020, www.twitter.com/ChineseEmbSA/status/1239453193689587712
79 Gitter, David, et al. “China Will Do Anything to
Deflect Coronavirus Blame.” Foreign Policy, 30 Mar. 2020,
www.foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/30/beijing-coronavirus-response-see-what-sticks-propaganda-blame-ccp-xi-jinping/
80 Feng, Emily, and Scott Neuman. “A Change in How 1
Chinese Province Reports Coronavirus Adds Thousands of Cases.” NPR, 13 Feb.
2020,
www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2020/02/13/805519117/a-change-in-how-one-chinese-province-reports-coronavirus-adds-thousands-of-cases?utm_medium=RSS&utm_campaign=globalhealth
81 Ma, Josephine, et al. “A Third of Virus Cases May
Be ‘Silent Carriers’, Classified Data Suggests.” South China Morning Post, 23
Mar. 2020,
www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3076323/third-coronavirus-cases-may-be-silent-carriers-classified
82 Renton, Adam, and Mike Hayes. “March 31
Coronavirus News.” CNN, 1 Apr. 2020,
www.cnn.com/world/live-news/coronavirus-pandemic-03-31-20/index.html
day.
According to one Wuhan resident, many believed the actual death toll was in
excess of 40,000 by the end of March.83
Disappearances
of Doctors and Journalists
The
CCP’s cover-up was not limited to the suppression of data or case numbers but
involved gross violations of human rights as well. Three citizen journalists
were disappeared after publishing videos taken in Wuhan of hospitals and
crematoriums. One, Li Zehua, resurfaced on April 23rd. In a video posted
online, Li said that he was removed from his apartment on February 26th by CCP
security agents, who detained him for 24 hours for “disrupting public order”
before forcibly quarantining him in a hotel until March 14th. He was then
returned to Wuhan and forced to quarantine for another 14 days.84
According
to the Committee to Protect Journalists, Li originally traveled to Wuhan to
investigate the disappearance of another journalist, Chen Quishi, who the CCP
had previously disappeared. Neither Chen Quishi nor Fang Bin, another
journalist who was disappeared, have resurfaced.
Additionally,
there are multiple, disturbing examples of the CCP harassing, detaining, and
potentially disappearing Chinese doctors who attempted to warn others about the
realities of the outbreak. Dr. Li, the doctor noted above who revealed on
WeChat there were seven confirmed cases of SARS connected to the Huanan market,
was reprimanded by hospital officials. On January 3rd, four days after he
warned his fellow doctors, Dr. Li was forced by the Wuhan Public Security
Bureau to sign a letter that accused him of “making false comments” that “severely
disturbed the social order.”85
He
was also threatened with criminal prosecution. Dr. Li was one of at least eight
doctors in Wuhan harassed by the police for publicly discussing the outbreak.86
Their
punishment was broadcast on national television, intimidating other doctors and
discouraging them from speaking up.87
After
Dr. Li signed the letter he returned to work, where he contracted the virus
five days later. After being admitted to the emergency department of the same
hospital in which he worked, Dr. Li died on February 7th.88
Dr.
Li and the other seven doctors were not the only medical professionals that
were harassed by CCP officials. Dr. Ai, who shared the laboratory test
confirming SARS with Dr. Li, ordered her staff to begin wearing masks on
January 1st after a healthcare worker arrived in her Emergency Department from
another hospital. The patient, an owner of a private clinic, became ill after
treating patients with a fever. That evening, Dr. Ai was ordered to appear
before the hospital’s discipline board the next day, where she was blamed for “spreading
rumors.”89
Despite
83 “Estimates Show Wuhan Death Toll Far Higher Than
Official Figure.” Radio Free Asia, 1 Apr. 2020,
www.rfa.org/english/news/china/wuhan-deaths-03272020182846.html
84 “Chinese Citizen Journalist Resurfaces After
Going Missing in Wuhan.” The New York Times, 23 Apr. 2020,
www.nytimes.com/reuters/2020/04/23/world/asia/23reuters-health-coronavirus-china-journalist.html
85 “Li Wenliang: Coronavirus Kills Chinese Whistleblower
Doctor.” BBC News, 7 Feb. 2020, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-51403795
86 “China Exonerates Doctor Reprimanded for Warning
of Virus.” POLITICO, 20 Mar. 2020,
www.politico.com/news/2020/03/20/china-exonerates-doctor-reprimanded-for-warning-of-virus-138637
87 “China Didn’t Warn Public of Likely Pandemic For
6 Key Days.” AP NEWS, 15 Jan. 2020,
https://apnews.com/68a9e1b91de4ffc166acd6012d82c2f9
88 BBC News.
89 Page.
efforts
to defend herself and explain her concerns regarding human-to-human
transmission, the board accused her of causing panic and said she “damaged the
stability” of Wuhan.90
On
January 11th, it was confirmed that one of Dr. Ai’s nurses had contracted the
virus. After calling an emergency meeting of the hospital, her superiors
directed that the nurse’s medical chart be altered to reflect a less serious
diagnosis. Five days later, hospital officials reiterated their denial that
human-to-human transmission of the virus was occurring.91
On
March 10th, the Chinese magazine Renwu published an interview with Dr. Ai on
her first-hand account of her treatment and the CCP’s suppression of
information regarding the outbreak. Within three hours, the original report was
removed by CCP censors.
Failure
to Adhere to the International Health Regulations
During
late 2002 and early 2003, the PRC failed to report the outbreak of a new and
deadly disease within their borders. After four months, they notified the WHO
that the PRC was the source of the ongoing SARS outbreak. Chinese efforts to cover
up the source of the outbreak and their refusal to share information was
identified as a key factor in the outbreak growing to the scale it did.92
All
told, SARS spread to 28 countries outside of the PRC, resulting in more than
8,000 cases and 774 known deaths.93
As
a result, in 2005, the WHO Member States agreed to update the International
Health Regulations (IHR). The IHR is a legally binding instrument that
obligates all Member States of the WHO to carry out certain public health
functions. Article 6 requires Member States to inform the WHO of all events
occurring within their borders that may constitute a Public Health Emergency of
International Concern (PHEIC). Annex 2 of the IHR is a “decision instrument”
that provides countries a framework to determine if an event needs to be
reported. According to the WHO Guidance for the Use of Annex 2, there are two
categories of public health events that require Member State notification to
the WHO:
-all events that fulfill any two of four situational
public health criteria specified below.
-any event involving one or more cases of four
specific diseases (Small pox, SARS, Human Influenza caused by a new subtype,
Poliomyelitis due to wildtype poliovirus), irrespective of the context in which
they occur, because they are by definition unusual or unexpected and may cause
serious public health impact.94
Under
the first category, the four situational public health criteria are:
90 Ibid.
91 Gong, Jingqi. “Whistleblower.” Renwu, 10 Mar.
2020. Retrieved: http://archive.is/OLdHs
92 Epstein, Gady A. “SARS Outbreak Exposing Flaws in
China Regime.” Baltimoresun.com, Baltimore Sun, 23 Apr. 2003,
www.baltimoresun.com/bal-te.china23apr23-story.html
93 Pasley, James. “How SARS Terrified the World in
2003, Infecting More than 8,000 People and Killing 774.” Business Insider, 20
Feb. 2020,
www.businessinsider.com/deadly-sars-virus-history-2003-in-photos-2020-2
94 The World Health Organization, WHO Guidance for
the Use of Annex 2 of the INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGUALTIONS (2005), WHO/HSE/IHR/2010.4.
https://www.who.int/ihr/revised_annex2_guidance.pdf
-Is
the public health impact of the event serious? (yes/no)
-Is
the event unusual or unexpected? (yes/no)
-Is
there any significant risk of international spread? (yes/no)
-Is
there any significant risk of international travel or trade restrictions?
(yes/no)95
The
WHO guidance provides questions and examples of circumstances to be used when
determining the answer to the four criteria above. Criterion one provides
several questions, including one that asks if “the event [has] the potential to
have a high public health impact?” The provided examples of circumstances that
contribute to a high public health impact include a “pathogen with high
potential to cause an epidemic” and “cases among health staff.” Given that the
virus had been identified as related to SARS-CoV and that cases were reported
amongst healthcare staff in Wuhan, under the guidelines, the CCP’s answer to
the above question should have been “yes” and the first criterion should have
been satisfied.
Similarly,
the CCP’s answer to the second criterion should have also been “yes.” The
outbreak in Wuhan was unusual, in that it was caused by an unknown agent and
from an unknown source, two examples provided in the WHO guidance. At this
point, two criteria having been satisfied, the CCP should have notified the WHO
in accordance with Annex 2. The CCP failed to do so.
An
examination of the remaining criteria also suggests that both of the other
criteria were also satisfied. The third criterion assesses whether the event
poses a significant risk of international spread. The guidance asks if there is
“any factor that should alert WHO to the potential for cross border movement of
the agent, vehicle or host?” During the 2003 SARS pandemic, the PRC did not
publicly acknowledge the outbreak before the beginning of the Spring Festival
travel season. As a result, SARS quickly spread in Guangdong before appearing
in Hong Kong and countries outside of the PRC.96 Given the direct correlation
between the decision to not warn the public before the Spring Festival during
the 2003 outbreak and the spread of the virus, the millions of trips abroad
scheduled in late January and early February 2020 alone should have given the
CCP cause to answer this criterion in the affirmative.
Finally,
the fourth criterion regards significant risk to international travel and
trade. WHO guidance questions include: “Have similar events in the past
resulted in international restrictions? Is the source suspected or known to be
a food product…that [is] imported/exported internationally? Are there requests
for information by foreign officials or international media?” In the case of
the early stages of the outbreak, the CCP’s answer to criterion four should
have been a resounding “yes.” The 2003 SARS pandemic resulted in travel
advisories and cargo quarantines. CCP officials knew that the cases were
confirmed by laboratories to be SARS. The CCP knew the early outbreak was
centered in or around the Huanan market, which included multiple species of
animals known to carry coronaviruses that can infect humans. Local and
95 Ibid.
96 Epstein.
international
media outlets were beginning to break stories about the cases of atypical
pneumonia.
In
sum, as early as mid-December, and no later than December 27th, the CCP had
enough information to assess it was legally obligated to inform the WHO that
the outbreak in Wuhan was an event “that may constitute a Public Health
Emergency of International Concern.”97
Had
the CCP not been committed to covering up the outbreak, it would have answered
YES to all four of the criteria and notified the WHO. The CCP failed to do so.
When
considering the second category of public health events that Member States are
legally bound to report to the WHO, the CCP’s failure to fulfill their
obligation under the IHR is even more clear. The second category requires
notification of:
Any
event involving one or more cases of four specific diseases (Small pox, SARS,
Human Influenza caused by a new subtype, Poliomyelitis due to wildtype
poliovirus), irrespective of the context in which they occur, because they are
by definition unusual or unexpected and may cause serious public health
impact.98
The
same WHO guidance defines a notifiable case of SARS as “an individual with
laboratory confirmation of infection with SARS coronavirus (SARS-CoV) who
either fulfils the clinical case definition of SARS”99
or
has worked with SARS-CoV in a laboratory. The clinical case definition for SARS
consists of four criteria:
A history of fever, or documented fever; AND
One or more symptoms of lower respiratory tract
illness (cough, difficulty breathing, shortness of breath); AND
Radiographic evidence of lung infiltrates consistent
with pneumonia or acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) or autopsy
findings consistent with the pathology of pneumonia or ARDS without an
identifiable cause; AND
No alternative diagnosis can fully explain the
illness.100
As
early as mid-December, when the 65-year-old gentleman was admitted to Wuhan
Central, hospitals in the city were treating dozens of patients who satisfied
this clinical definition of SARS. Several workers from the Huanan market and
their family members presented with a fever, cough, lung infiltrates consistent
with pneumonia, and no alternative diagnosis. On December 27th the Hubei
Provincial Hospital of Integrated Chinese and Western Medicine informed the
Wuhan CDC that a SARS-like novel coronavirus is responsible for the disease
97 The World Health Organization, WHO Guidance for
the Use of Annex 2 of the INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGUALTIONS (2005),
WHO/HSE/IHR/2010.4. https://www.who.int/ihr/revised_annex2_guidance.pdf
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
outbreak
in Wuhan.101
According
to public reporting, there were at least seven patients who received laboratory
confirmation of a SARS coronavirus infection.102
As
stated in the WHO guidance, a single case of SARS, confirmed by both laboratory
results and a clinical diagnosis, requires Member States to notify the WHO. By
December 30th, CCP health authorities knew that at least seven patients in
Wuhan met this requirement.
The
next day, December 31st, WHO headquarters in Geneva directed the WHO China
Country Office to seek verification of media reports concerning the ongoing
outbreak. The PRC did not inform the WHO about the outbreak, their knowledge
that multiple patients had be diagnosed with SARS, or that the outbreak was
being caused by a novel coronavirus genetically similar to SARS-CoV. The CCP’s
failure to notify the WHO about the outbreak was a violation of Article 6 of
the IHR. The CCP’s failure to report the SARS cases under Annex 2 was also
violation of Article 6. The CCP’s failure to provide the WHO with the genetic
sequence of the virus, already produced by the WIV, was likely also a violation
of Article 6, which requires Member States to provide “all relevant public
health information” about events that may constitute a PHEIC.
Similarity
to CCP Actions during the 2003 SARS Pandemic
Given
CCP malfeasance during the 2003 SARS pandemic was the basis for the 2005
reforms to the IHR, it is prudent to examine their failures in handling SARS
and how they compare with the mishandling of COVID-19. During the early stages
of the SARS outbreak, the PRC banned the Chinese press from reporting on the
outbreak.103
As
early as January 27, 2003, classified documents in Beijing were produced
discussing the outbreak.104
Once
it did notify the WHO, four months after the start of the outbreak, the CCP
continued to provide inaccurate information about the number of SARS cases
within its borders.105
Similar
to the early days of COVID-19, requests for access to the epicenter of the SARS
outbreak were denied by the CCP. Even after the WHO was admitted, the cover-up
continued; CCP officials went so far as to put SARS patients in hospital rooms
and in ambulances driving around the city to hide them from the WHO.106
As
mentioned in this report, in early 2003 the CCP failed to warn the public about
the outbreak prior to the massive travel season surrounding the Spring Festival.
101 Page.
102 Petersen, Eskild, et al. “Li Wenliang, a face to
the frontline healthcare worker. The first doctor to notify the emergence of
the SARS-CoV-2, (COVID-19), outbreak.” International Journal of Infectious
Diseases, vol. 93, 1 Apr. 2020, pg. 205-207, doi:10.1016/jjijid.2020.02.052
103 Rosenthal, Elisabeth, and Lawrence K. Altman. “China
Raises Tally of Cases and Deaths in Mystery Illness.” The New York Times, 27
Mar. 2003,
www.nytimes.com/2003/03/27/world/china-raises-tally-of-cases-and-deaths-in-mystery-illness.html
104 Tkacik, John. “An American Response to China’s
SARS Failures.” The Heritage Foundation, 25 Apr. 2003,
www.heritage.org/asia/report/american-response-chinas-sars-failures
105 Rosenthal.
106 Epstein, Gady A. “Chinese Admit to SARS
Mistakes.” Baltimoresun.com, Baltimore Sun, 1 Apr. 2003,
www.baltimoresun.com/bal-te.sars21apr21-story.html
It
is evident that there are clear correlations between the CCP’s behavior during
the 2003 SARS pandemic and the ongoing COVID-19 global pandemic. To date we
have identified eight behaviors that the CCP engaged in during both their
failed handling of SARS and their cover-up regarding COVID-19:
CCP
Actions SARS COVID-19
Waited
to inform the WHO? ✔ ✔
Subsequently
hid information from the WHO? ✔ ✔
Hid
their knowledge of the severity of the outbreak? ✔ ✔
Disrupted
press from reporting? ✔ ✔
Response
kept secret until after the Spring Festival travel season began? ✔ ✔
Limited
access of outside experts to epicenter of the outbreak? ✔ ✔
Claimed
the virus was under control? ✔ ✔
Underreported
number of cases? ✔ ✔
The
startling similarity in the CCP’s mishandling of the two outbreaks only adds to
the evidence that the spread and impact of COVID-19 could have been prevented.
The PRC had faced a similar crisis before, sought to hide it, and the world
suffered for their mistake. When faced with a second, incredibly similar
scenario, CCP officials doubled down on their past mistakes and COVID-19 became
the second, more deadly and damaging chapter of a story that began in 2002.
Likely
Impact on Global Response
As
a result of intentional efforts to mislead the global community and delays in
releasing factual information about the virus, the CCP cover-up greatly
impacted the global response to COVID-19. Even once the response began, it was
informed by WHO guidelines developed based on CCP lies and disinformation.
According to John Mackenzie, a member of the WHO Executive Committee, the
international response would have been different if not for the CCP’s “reprehensible”107
obfuscation
of the outbreak’s extent. When asked about the delay, Zuo-Feng Zhang, an
epidemiologist at the University of California, Los Angeles, said:
This is tremendous. If they took action six days earlier,
there would have been much fewer patients and medical facilities would have
been sufficient. We might have avoided the collapse of Wuhan’s medical
system108
It
is possible to calculate, at least partially, the impact of the CCP cover-up on
the spread of the virus. A study conducted by researchers at the University of
Southampton examined the
107 Wong, Sue-Lin. WHO Expert Says China Too Slow to
Report Coronavirus Cases. Financial Times, 5 Feb. 2020,
www.ft.com/content/8ede7e92-4749-11ea-aeb3-955839e06441
108 “China Didn’t Warn Public of Likely Pandemic For
6 Key Days.” AP NEWS, 15 Jan. 2020,
https://apnews.com/68a9e1b91de4ffc166acd6012d82c2f9
impact
of three non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) – travel restrictions,
containment measures, and contact restrictions (social distancing, masks, etc.)
– on the spread of the virus in China. According to their research, the
implementation of these NPIs prior to the January 23rd lockdown of Wuhan would
have reduced the number of cases by 66% (one week earlier), 86% (two weeks
earlier), or 95% (three weeks earlier).109
By
comparing the earlier timeline to the information in this study it is clear CCP
health officials and senior leadership had the information required, at a date
early enough, to reduce China’s COVID-19 cases by at least 86% compared to the
estimated caseload at the end of February.110
There
are three scenarios in which China could have implemented NPIs earlier than the
January 23rd lockdown of Wuhan:
Scenario
1
After
receiving the December 30th laboratory results confirming a case of SARS, Dr.
Ai informed the Department of Public Health. In the first scenario, CCP health
officials comply with their legal obligations under the 2005 IHR and inform the
WHO of a confirmed SARS outbreak within 24 hours. The WHO provides expert
advice and the National Health Commission and Wuhan officials implement similar
NPIs as were successful during the 2003 SARS pandemic. In this scenario, more
than 95% of the estimated cases in China at the end of February would have been
prevented. Such a large reduction in caseload would have prevented the collapse
of the Wuhan health system and reduced the spread of the virus. It is highly
likely that this would have prevented COVID-19 from becoming a global pandemic.
Scenario
2
In
the second scenario the CCP implements NPIs prior to January 9th, two weeks
earlier than it did. As January progressed, caseloads were climbing. The
Department of Public Health knew about the confirmed SARS cases, the National
Health Commission had been informed by two separate labs that the novel
coronavirus was similar to SARS-CoV, and local hospital management knew that
their healthcare staff was becoming infected and wearing personal protective
equipment in response. Instead of punishing those who talked about it, the CCP
institutes a public response to the virus. Had the CCP instituted NPIs prior to
January 9th, it would have reduced the estimated number of cases in China at
the end of February by 86%. It is likely that this would have prevented
COVID-19 from becoming a global pandemic.
Scenario
3
109 Lai, Shengjie, et al. “Effect of
Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions for Containing the COVID-19 Outbreak in China.”
MedRxiv, 2020, doi:10.1101/2020.03.03.20029843.
110 Ibid.
The
final scenario is based on the January 14th teleconference between senior CCP
leadership. Instead of ordering a secret response and having the National
Health Commission issue confidential response plans to provincial health
officials, General Secretary Xi could have ordered the implementation of NPIs.
Instead of choosing to keep the information hidden for another six days, the
senior leaders warn about the forthcoming pandemic, as well as the ongoing
human-to-human transmission. Had the CCP instituted NPIs in the days following
the teleconference, prior to January 16th, it is estimated that at least 66% of
cases in China at the end of February could have been prevented.
At
a minimum, it is estimated the CCP could have prevented two-thirds of cases in
China before the end of February. Such a massive reduction of cases would have
enabled a more focused response and the bolstering of the Wuhan health system,
as opposed to its collapse. It would have made contact tracing easier by
reducing the number of cases to track. Simply put, a transparent, rules-based
government that provided accurate and timely information to the international
community could have prevented a global pandemic. Instead, the CCP’s lies,
cover-up, and oppression of whistleblowers cost thousands of Chinese citizens
and hundreds of thousands of others around the world their lives.
The
Wuhan Institute of Virology
The
Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) has featured prominently in many of the
discussions regarding the origins of COVID-19. While the broad consensus of the
scientific and intelligence communities is that the virus is natural in origin,
some experts have hypothesized that SARS-CoV-2 leaked from the WIV through
improperly handled material or infected staff. Others have been quick to
dismiss these claims based on a low probability of such an event occurring.111
Other
experts initially identified the wildlife markets as the origination point of
human infection. However, without the epidemiological data of “patient zero,”
the destroyed lab samples, or the exact animal source of the virus, we may
never know the origination of SARS-CoV-2. However, it is prudent to examine
what is currently known about this institute, including the virus research that
occurs at its 20 laboratories.
Background
The
WIV was founded in 1956 as the Wuhan Microbiology Laboratory and has operated
under the administration of the Chinese Academy of Sciences since 1978.112 The
facility currently hosts laboratories meeting a variety of different safety
protocols ranging from Biosafety Level II (BSL-2), roughly equivalent to a
dentist’s office, to Biosafety Level IV (BSL-4), the highest level of biosafety
containment. According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services:
Biosafety
Level 4 is required for work with dangerous and exotic agents that pose a high
individual risk of aerosol-transmitted laboratory infections and life-
111 Barclay, Eliza. “Why These Scientists Still
Doubt the Coronavirus Leaked from a Chinese Lab.” Vox, 23 Apr. 2020,
www.vox.com/2020/4/23/21226484/wuhan-lab-coronavirus-china
112 “History.” Wuhan Institute of Virology,
http://english.whiov.cas.cn/About_Us2016/History2016/
threatening
disease that is frequently fatal, for which there are no vaccines or
treatments, or a related agent with unknown risk of transmission.113
According
to the WIV’s website, the facility houses 17 Biosafety Level II (BSL-2)
laboratories, two Biosafety Level III (BSL-3) laboratories, and one Biosafety
Level IV (BSL-4) laboratory.
Currently,
the Wuhan Institute of Virology hosts five scientific research groups: The
Center for Molecular Virology, Center for Molecular Biology and Nanobiology,
Center for Bacteria and Virus Resources and Application, Center for Virus
Pathology, and Center for Emerging Infectious Diseases. 114
The
Director of the Center for Emerging Infectious Diseases is Shi Zhengli, who
also runs the Emerging Viruses Group within the Center.115
History
of the BSL-4 Lab
The
WIV’s BSL-4 lab was constructed as a result of an agreement between the PRC and
France that was signed after the 2003 SARS pandemic.116
At
the time, all BSL-3 labs in the PRC were controlled by the PRC’s People’s
Liberation Army (PLA). Then-President of France, Jacques Chirac, and his Prime
Minister, Jean-Pierre Raffarin, approved the project despite concerns from both
the French Ministry of Defense and French intelligence services – Raffarin
himself described it as “a political agreement.” 117
The
PRC was suspected of having a biological warfare program, and the military and
intelligence services were worried that the dual-use technology required to
build a BSL-4 lab could be used misused by the PRC government. The uneasy
compromise reached within the French government was that the agreement would
require joint PRC-France research to be conducted in the lab, with French
researchers present.118
In
mid-June 2004, four months before the deal was finalized, the French
Directorate-General for External Security (DGSE) warned the French government
that the PRC was planning to develop a total of five BSL-4 labs, including two
managed by the military. This ran counter to the PRC’s public claims that it
was only seeking to build one such lab. Despite repeated concerns from the
French Ministry of Defense and intelligence services, French leadership
continued to move forward with the deal. Prime Minister Raffarin authorized the
exportation of four mobile BSL-3 labs to the PRC, a decision that was poorly
received by the French military. 119
113 United States, Department of Health and Human
Services. Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories, 5th
Edition. Dec. 2009.
https://www.cdc.gov/labs/pdf/CDC-BiosafetyMicrobiologicalBiomedicalLaboratories-2009-P.PDF
114 “Research Groups.” Wuhan Institute of Virology
.
http://english.whiov.cas.cn/Research2016/Group2016/
115 “Center for Emerging Infectious Disease.” Wuhan
Institute of Virology,
http://english.whiov.cas.cn/Research2016/Group2016/201411/t20141114_130855.html
116 “About WIV.” Wuhan Institute of Virology,
http://english.whiov.cas.cn/About_Us2016/Brief_Introduction2016/
117 Izambard, Antoine. “L’histoire Secrète Du
Laboratoire P4 De Wuhan Vendu Par La France à La Chine.” Challenges, 30 Apr.
2020,
www.challenges.fr/entreprise/sante-et-pharmacie/revelations-l-histoire-secrete-du-laboratoire-p4-de-wuhan-vendu-par-la-france-a-la-chine_707425
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid.
The
project did not progress well. According to one French diplomat, “our trust in
the Chinese waned during this cooperation.”120
There
were disagreements between the French architecture firm hired to design the
facility and the local Chinese construction company. The company hired to
certify the building quit without warning over liability concerns. After an
attempt by the PRC to use an unapproved construction company in 2014,121
the
lab eventually opened in 2015.122
Repairs
were required the very next year due to the use of bleach in the containment
showers by personnel at the WIV, delaying the formal opening of the lab until
2017.
The
issues extend beyond the construction of the BSL-4 lab itself. In 2016, the PRC
requested dozens of the containment suits required to work in the lab. The
French Dual-Use Commission, tasked with considering exports of sensitive
equipment, rejected their request. According to French reporting, the request
was “well above the needs of the Wuhan [lab].”123
This
continued to fuel concerns within the French Ministry of Defense that the PRC
was seeking to engage in military research or open a second BSL-4 lab for
military means. Despite the agreement that the BSL-4 lab would be a site of
joint research, and an announcement at the 2017 inauguration by then Prime
Minister Bernard Cazeneuve of 5 million euros in funding for that research, to
date there has only been one French scientist assigned to the lab. His tour
ends this year.124
Finally,
it is important to note the direct influence of the CCP within the WIV. The
Director General of the institute is Wang Yanyi,125
who
joined the China Zhi Gong Party of the CCP in 2010. In 2018, the same year she
because the Director General of the WIV, she was elected the Deputy Director of
the Wuhan Municipal Party Committee.126
Until
early 2020, the BSL-4 lab was managed by Yuan Zhiming.127
Yuan
is the President of the Chinese Communist Party Committee within the Wuhan
Branch of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, to which the WIV belongs.128
Local
CCP leaders not only run the WIV itself, but also directly managed the BSL-4
lab.129
According
to a French diplomat, Yuan’s performance and management was subpar – the lab
has been underutilized and the most talented scientists have left. After the
SARS-CoV-2 outbreak began, Yuan was replaced on January 31, 2020.130
In
a possible fulfillment of the
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid.
122 “About WIV.” Wuhan Institute of Virology,
http://english.whiov.cas.cn/About_Us2016/Brief_Introduction2016/
123 Ibid.
124 Izambard.
125 “Directors.” Wuhan Institute of Virology, http://english.whiov.cas.cn/About_Us2016/Directors2016/
126 “Wang Yanyi, Deputy Director of Wuhan Virus
Institute, Was Elected to the Deputy Director of the Wuhan Municipal Party
Committee.” æ¦æ±‰ç—…毒所副所长王延轶当选致公党æ¦æ±‰å¸‚副主任委员, 13 Oct. 2018,
www.whiov.ac.cn/xwdt_105286/zhxw/201810/t20181023_5148932.html
127 Izambard.
128 “Directors.” Wuhan Branch, Chinese Academy of
Sciences, http://english.whb.cas.cn/au/ds/
129 Izambard.
130 Ibid.
concerns
raised by the French defense and intelligence services almost two decades
prior, he was succeeded by Major General Chen Wei, the PRC’s top biowarfare
expert.131
Shi
Zhengli (“Bat-Woman”) and Gain-of-Function Research
The
lead expert for emerging infectious diseases is Shi Zhengli. Nicknamed “bat
woman” by her professional colleagues, Shi has spent more than 16 years
researching bats and coronaviruses. This work often involves visiting caves
throughout the PRC to collect blood, saliva samples, fecal swaps, urine, and
fecal pellets from wild bats in order to identify and catalogue wild
coronaviruses.132
As
of 2017, more than 300 unique bat coronavirus sequences had been collected.133
Shi
has published extensively on coronaviruses and their ability to infect humans,
including a 2005 paper that proved “bats are natural reservoirs of SARS-like
coronaviruses.”134
In
recent months, particular attention has been given to a 2015 paper entitled “A
SARS-like cluster of circulating bat coronavirus shows potential for human
emergence.”135
Shi
and her colleagues, along with researchers from the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill, Harvard Medical School, the Institute of Microbiology
in Switzerland, and the U.S. National Center for Toxicological Research,
conducted gain-of-function research with SHC014-CoV, a wild coronavirus.136
Gain-of-function
research is research that has “the potential to enhance the pathogenicity or
transmissibility of potential pandemic pathogens.”137
During
the 2015 research project, Shi and her colleagues used a SARS-CoV reverse
genetics system to create a chimeric (hybrid) virus by inserting the spike
protein from SHC014 into a mouse-adapted SARS-CoV backbone.138
(Spike
proteins are the major surface structures that enable coronaviruses to bind to
receptors on human cells.139)
This
new virus was then shown to bind to a specific receptor (ACE2) in humans,
replicate “efficiently”140
in
primary human airways cells, and withstand antibodies and vaccines. Researchers
concluded that the work “suggests a potential risk of SARS-CoV re-emergence
from viruses currently circulating in bat
131 Huang, Yanzhong. “U.S.-Chinese Distrust Is
Inviting Dangerous Coronavirus Conspiracy Theories.” Foreign Affairs, 20 Apr.
2020, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-03-05/us-chinese-distrust-inviting-dangerous-coronavirus-conspiracy
132 Qiu, Jane. How China’s ‘Bat Woman’ Hunted Down
Viruses from SARS to the New Coronavirus. June 2020,
www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-chinas-bat-woman-hunted-down-viruses-from-sars-to-the-new-coronavirus1/
133 Cyranoski, David. “Bat Cave Solves Mystery of
Deadly SARS Virus - and Suggests New Outbreak Could Occur.” Nature News, 1 Dec.
2017, www.nature.com/articles/d41586-017-07766-9
134 Li, Wendong et al. “Bats are Natural Reservoirs
of SARS-like Coronaviruses.” Science vol. 310, 5748 (2005): 676-679.
doi:10.1126/science.1118391
135 Menachery, Vineet D et al. “A SARS-like cluster
of circulating bat coronaviruses shows potential for human emergence.” Nature
medicine vol. 21,12 (2015): 1508-13. doi:10.1038/nm.3985
136 Ibid.
137 “Gain of Function Research.” National Institutes
of Health, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
https://osp.od.nih.gov/biotechnology/gain-of-function-research/
138 Menachery.
139 Saplakoglu, Yasemin. “Researchers Map Structure
of Coronavirus ‘Spike’ Protein.” Scientific American, 21 Feb. 2020,
www.scientificamerican.com/article/researchers-map-structure-of-coronavirus-spike-protein/
140 Menachery
populations.”141
It
is important to note that genetic structure of this manufactured virus differs
from SARS-CoV-2 by more than 5,000 nucleotides.142
For
context, the entire genetic sequence of SARS-CoV-2 is approximately 30,000
nucleotides.143
This
research was partially funded by grants from the U.S. federal government.
Specifically, funding for this research came from the National Institute of
Allergy & Infectious Disease and the National Institute of Aging within the
U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH) as well as the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID). The USAID funding was awarded to EcoHealth
Alliance, who provided the funding to the WIV.144
EcoHealth
Alliance is a New York based global health nonprofit focused on the emergence
of new diseases145
and
was a USAID partner for the PREDICT project, which sought to identify “new
emerging infectious disease that could become a threat to human life.”146
U.S.
funding for all gain-of-function research, both within the United States and
abroad, was paused in October 2014 due to safety concerns not related to the
WIV.147
The
bulk of the research for the 2015 paper had already been completed and the NIH
allowed the researchers to move forward.148
After
the NIH developed more advanced and safety-conscious policies related to
gain-of-function research, new guidance was released in January 2017 and the
paused lifted.149
However,
on April 19, 2020, the Deputy Director for Extramural Research at the NIH
informed EcoHealth Alliance that the NIH was “pursuing suspension of Wuhan
Institute of Virology from participation in federal programs.”150
Five
days later, the project was terminated entirely. Due to the ongoing
investigation, the NIH has not yet released additional details.151
Safety
Issues and Historical Precedent
Questions
of safety at the WIV have persisted for some time and come in the broader
context of a history of lab accidents in the PRC. Between April 22nd and April
29th, 2004, the PRC reported nine new cases of SARS linked to an accident at a
government lab in Beijing. Two of those cases were graduate students conducting
research at the PRC’s National Institute of
141.Ibid.
142 Liu, Shan-Lu et al. “No credible evidence
supporting claims of the laboratory engineering of SARS-CoV-2.” Emerging
microbes & infections vol. 9,1 505-507. 26 Feb. 2020, doi:10.1080/22221751.2020.1733440
143 Sah, Ranjit, et al. “Complete Genome Sequence of
a 2019 Novel Coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) Strain Isolated in Nepal.” Microbiology
Resource Announcements, American Society for Microbiology, 12 Mar. 2020,
mra.asm.org/content/9/11/e00169-20
144 Ibid.
145 “About.” EcoHealth Alliance,
www.ecohealthalliance.org/about
146 “PREDICT.” EcoHealth Alliance,
www.ecohealthalliance.org/program/predict
147 “Gain of Function Research.” National Institutes
of Health, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
https://osp.od.nih.gov/biotechnology/gain-of-function-research/
148 Menachery
149 “Gain of Function Research.” National Institutes
of Health, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
https://osp.od.nih.gov/biotechnology/gain-of-function-research/
150 Geraghty, Jim. “NIH: We Can’t Release Our Papers
about the Wuhan Institute of Virology Because of a Pending Investigation.”
National Review, 1 June 2020,
www.nationalreview.com/corner/nih-we-cant-release-our-papers-about-the-wuhan-institute-of-virology-because-of-a-pending-investigation/
151 Ibid.
Virology
Laboratory (NIVL).152
According
to the WHO, the NIVL was conducting research using both live and inactivated
samples of SARS-CoV, the virus that causes SARS in humans.153
The
graduate students, a 26-year-old postgraduate student and a 31-year-old
post-doctoral student, were infected in two separate incidents, two weeks
apart.154
As
a result of the graduate students becoming infected, seven other additional
cases of SARS in China and one fatality were confirmed.155
In
addition, at least two State Department cables from early 2018 reportedly
raised the issue of safety concerns at the WIV. According to public reporting,
the official cables came from State Department personnel at Embassy Beijing and
Consulate General Wuhan and focused on issues related to safety and management
weaknesses at the WIV. Scientists at the WIV themselves noted “a serious
shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely
operate this high-containment laboratory.”156
According
to Shi, she was very worried that a similar incident could have happened at the
WIV and that her lab could have been the origin of the COVID-19 pandemic. In an
interview, Shi recounted how she reexamined several years of her own lab’s
records to check for mishandling of material and improper disposal. She also
compared the coronavirus samples in her collection to samples of SARS-CoV-2,
the virus that causes COVID-19. Shi later stated she was relieved after
completing this review and failing finding a match – “That really took a load
off my mind. I had not slept a wink for days.”157
While
this is not evidence that the ongoing pandemic is the result of a release,
accidental or deliberate, from the lab, or what the staffing status was at the
time of the outbreak of COVID-19 in late 2019, it is important to consider
these concerns in light of the PRC’s history with lab accidents. However, given
that the CCP has refused to share samples from the WIV and other sites in the
PRC, it is impossible for the international community to verify the results of
Shi’s review.
Lack
of Clarity
Ultimately,
no conclusion has been reached as to what role, if any, the WIV played in the
origins of the COVID-19 pandemic. Francis Collins, the Director of the National
Institutes of Health, has publicly that he has “no way of knowing” if the
outbreak originated at the WIV.158
152 “SARS Update—May 19, 2004.” Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, 19 May 2004, www.cdc.gov/sars/media/2004-05-19.html
153 “China’s Latest SARS Outbreak Has Been
Contained, but Biosafety Concerns Remain – Update 7.” World Health
Organization, 18 May 2004, www.who.int/csr/don/2004_05_18a/en/
154 Walgate, Robert. “SARS Escaped Beijing Lab
Twice.” Genome Biology, BioMed Central, 27 Apr. 2004,
https://genomebiology.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/gb-spotlight-20040427-03
155 “SARS Update—May 19, 2004.” Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, 19 May 2004, www.cdc.gov/sars/media/2004-05-19.html
156 Rogin, Josh. “Opinion | State Department Cables
Warned of Safety Issues at Wuhan Lab Studying Bat Coronaviruses.” The
Washington Post, 14 Apr. 2020,
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/14/state-department-cables-warned-safety-issues-wuhan-lab-studying-bat-coronaviruses/
157 Qiu.
158 Brennan, Zachary. “NIH Director: ‘No Way of
Knowing’ If Coronavirus Escaped from Wuhan Lab.” POLITICO, 27 May 2020,
www.politico.com/news/2020/05/27/nih-director-wuhan-coronavirus-collins-285681
However,
there are a series of outstanding issues with the WIV and its BSL-4 lab that
compound the ongoing debate:
The CCP’s refusal to allow the WIV to share samples
of the virus, as discussed elsewhere in this report;
The history of gain-of-function research on
coronaviruses at the facility;
The two leaks of SARS-CoV from the NIVL during the
2003 SARS pandemic;
Shi’s self-described anxiety that her lab may have
been the source of the outbreak;
The CCP’s refusal to share samples from the WIV or
allow access to international investigators;
Concerns from the French government regarding the
secretive relationship between the lab and the PRC’s military;
The PRC’s military takeover of the BSL-4 lab; and
The general lack of transparency and CCP cover-up of
the origins of the COVID-19 global pandemic.
Until
the CCP agrees to cooperate with the WHO, other countries, and the
international scientific community, it will be impossible to gather the
concrete evidence needed to prove, or disprove, this theory. The CCP’s decision
to require labs other than the WIV to destroy their samples, as discussed
earlier in the report, further obfuscates the issue. As a direct result of the
CCP cover-up during the early stages of the pandemic, it is certain that this
debate will continue.
World
Health Organization Missteps
In
addition to the obligations imparted on Member States, the IHR requires certain
actions and behaviors of the WHO. Among other obligations, the WHO is tasked
with conducting global public health surveillance and assessment of significant
public health events, disseminating public health information to Member States,
and determining whether a particular event notified by a Member State under the
IHR constitutes a PHEIC. In each of these obligations, the WHO failed to
fulfill its mandate.
Assessment
of Significant Public Health Events and Dissemination of Public Health
Information to Member States
Nothing
in the IHR requires the WHO to rely solely on information provided by the
Member State in whose territory a public health event is occurring. Instead,
Article 9 of the IHR requires the WHO evaluate reports from sources other than
notifications or consultations conducted under the IHR process for their
potential global health impact. The WHO’s website hosts a “frequently asked
questions” section about the 2005 IHR that refers to “WHO’s mandate to seek
verification of unofficial reports of events with potential international
implications.”159
Article
9 requires that the WHO assess these reports “according to established
epidemiological principles,”160
before
communicating the information to the Member State in whose territory the event
is reportedly occurring. Additionally, the Article stipulates the “WHO shall
make the information received available to the State Parties.”161
Due
to Taiwan’s exclusion from the WHO, its notification of SARS-like cases in the
PRC, on the surface, appears to be the exact type of “unofficial” report that
Article 9 was designed to address. As such, the WHO was obligated to examine
Taiwan’s email notification on the basis of epidemiological principles, not
political ones, and pass the information to all WHO Member States. The WHO
failed to do so.
It
also appears that the WHO failed to investigate the widely reported warnings
issued by Dr. Ho of the University of Hong Kong’s (UHK) Centre of Infection on
January 4th. Dr. Ho stated that based on the uptick in cases, it was highly
likely that human-to-human transmission was already occurring. He also warned
about a potential surge of cases during the Spring Festival travel season.162
Dr.
Ho’s warning was significant because UHK’s School of Public Health has been a
designated WHO Collaborating Centre for Infectious Disease Epidemiology and
Control (WHO CC) since 2014. Among other areas of research, the WHO CC focuses
on “emergency response to outbreaks of novel pathogens.”163
As
a member of the Li Ka Shing Faculty of Medicine at UHK, Dr. Ho is a member of
the WHO CC.164
Dr.
Ho is well acquainted with coronaviruses and SARS, having published extensively
on the diagnosis and treatment of SARS, as well as SARS-related hospital
infection control and admission strategies.165
In
2005, he and two others authored a chapter on infection control for a clinical
guide to SARS.166
Under
Article 9, the WHO is mandated to investigate unofficial reports and warnings
like those from Dr. Ho. Had the WHO done so, the world would have been warned
about the high likelihood of human-to-human transmission sixteen days prior to
the CCP confirming what Dr. Ho already knew. In failing to investigate his
warnings, the WHO violated Article 9 and ignored a member of their designated
group of infectious disease control experts.
Article
10 of the IHR requires the WHO to request verification of these unofficial
reports from the Member State in which the events are reportedly occurring.
There is no public evidence the WHO did so with regards to reports concerning
human-to-human transmission. Article 10 also stipulates that should a Member
State not accept the WHO’s offer of collaboration (which it is required to
extend), the “WHO may, when justified by the magnitude of the public health
risk,
159 “Frequently Asked Questions about the
International Health Regulations (2005).” World Health Organization, 18 Aug.
2009, www.who.int/ihr/about/faq/en/
160 2005 IHR.
161 Ibid.
162 Choi, Jimmy. “‘Wuhan Virus Probably Is Spreading
between People’.” RTHK, 4 Jan. 2020,
https://news.rthk.hk/rthk/en/component/k2/1500994-20200104.htm
163 “WHO Collaborating Centre for Infectious Disease
Epidemiology and Control.” School of Public Health,
https://sph.hku.hk/en/about-us/divisioncentreunit/who-collaborating-centre-for-infectious-disease-epidemiology-and-control
164 Ibid.
165 PL Ho .” ORCID,
http://orcid.org/0000-0002-8811-1308
166 Peiris, Malik, et. a. Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome: A Clinical Guide. Malden, Mass: Blackwell Pub, 2005. Print.
share
with other States Parties the information available to it.”167
Under
the IHR, the WHO was fully empowered to not only demand the CCP respond to
allegations made by the Taiwan CDC and UHK WHO CC regarding human-to-human
transmission, but also to share those warnings with the other WHO Member States
if China refused to cooperate. The WHO failed to do so.
Article
11 mandates that the WHO transmit to all Member States, “as soon as possible,”168
public
health information it receives under Articles 5 – 10 that is necessary for
Member States to respond to the public health risk. This includes unofficial
reports under Article 9. The WHO did not transmit Taiwan’s report of evidence
of human-to-human transmission to its Member States, violating its obligations
under Article 11. Likewise, there is no public record of the WHO transmitting
to Member States Dr. Ho’s comments that human-to-human transmission was likely
already occurring in Wuhan.
Determining
Whether A Particular Event Constitutes A PHEIC
Article
12 of the IHR provides the framework to be used by the WHO Director-General
when considering the declaration of a PHEIC. Namely, it requires that the
Director-General consider:
Information provided by the State Party;
The decision instrument contained in Annex 2;
The advice of the Emergency Committee;
Scientific principles as well as the available
scientific evidence and other relevant information; and
An assessment of the risk to human health, of the
risk of international spread of disease and of the risk of interference with
international traffic.169
It
has been clearly established that the CCP suppressed and failed to transmit
critical scientific evidence to the WHO that could have better informed
Director-General Tedros’ decision making when evaluating the need to declare a
PHEIC. However, a review of the information available to Director-General
Tedros on January 23rd, when he opted not to declare a PHEIC, shows that he
failed to follow the framework in Article 12. The following information was
either sent to the WHO or publicly reported prior to January 23rd:
-The
possibility of human-to-human transmission (Taiwan and the University of Hong
Kong)
-Evidence
of limited human-to-human transmission, as reported by the WHO delegation to
Wuhan.
-The
confirmation by the CCP’s National Health Commission (NHC) that human-to-human
transmission was occurring.
-The
confirmation of cases among healthcare workers by the NHC.170
-The
identification of a novel coronavirus as the cause of COVID-19.
167 2005 IHR.
168 Ibid.
169 Ibid.
170 Schnirring, Lisa. “New Coronavirus Infects
Health Workers, Spreads to Korea.” CIDRAP, 20 Jan. 2020,
www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2020/01/new-coronavirus-infects-health-workers-spreads-korea
-The
full genetic sequence of SARS-CoV-2, showing an 87% similarity to the virus
responsible for the 2003 SARS pandemic.
-Ongoing
mass international travel of people in China related to the Spring Festival.
-The
confirmation of COVID-19 cases in Thailand, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea,
Taiwan, and the United States.
Applying
the decision instrument in Annex 2, as directed in Article 12, should have
resulted in a determination that the outbreak was a potential PHEIC. The
available scientific evidence and relevant information regarding human-to-human
transmission, along with the similarity of SARS-CoV-2 to the virus that caused
the 2003 SARS outbreak, suggested a response similar to that in 2003 would be
necessary. An assessment of the risk of international spread should have
included, by necessity, the millions of international trips that the CCP
allowed to depart from the PRC in mid-January, as well as the cases already
confirmed in multiple countries outside of the PRC. In light of the media
reports already available to him concerning the CCP’s withholding of the fact
that the virus was a coronavirus genetically similar to SARS, the
Director-General should have acted appropriately.
By
January 23rd, when the WHO’s Emergency Committee was split on declaring a
PHEIC, Director-General Tedros either knew, or should have known, that the
outbreak centered in Wuhan was caused by a novel coronavirus genetically
similar to the virus responsible for the 2003 SARS pandemic, that
human-to-human transmission was occurring, that healthcare workers were being
infected, and that at least four WHO Member States, in addition to Hong Kong
and Taiwan, were reporting cases. When compared to the framework provided by
Article 12, it is clear the preponderance of information available to
Director-General Tedros, combined with approximately half of the members of the
Emergency Committee recommending the declaration of a PHEIC, should have
resulted in the Director-General declaring a Public Health Emergency of International
Concern. Instead, Director-General Tedros declined to the declare a PHEIC,
traveled to Beijing five days later, and praised the CCP’s handling of the
outbreak and the “transparency” with which they shared information with the WHO
and other countries. Only after his return from the PRC did the
Director-General declare a PHEIC, seven days after he previously declined to do
so.
The
decision of Director-General Tedros, and the divide amongst the Emergency
Committee, appears to be of a political nature, not scientific. The chair of
the Emergency Committee explained the lack of a recommendation supporting a
PHEIC declaration was in part due to the perception of such a declaration by
the people in the PRC responding to the outbreak.171
It
appears self-evident that this is a reference to the CCP, not doctors or
patients in Wuhan. A similar political decision repeatedly delayed the
declaration of a PHEIC in 2019 during the response to the Ebola outbreak in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.172
171 Pillinger, Mara. “Analysis | The WHO Held off on
Declaring the Wuhan Coronavirus a Global Health Emergency. Here’s Why.” The
Washington Post, 26 Jan. 2020,
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/01/26/who-held-off-declaring-wuhan-coronavirus-global-health-emergency-heres-why/
172 Ibid.
Deference
to the CCP’s Cover-up
From
the early stages of the outbreak, the WHO, under Director-General Tedros’
leadership, parroted and upheld as inviolable truth, statements from the CCP.
An examination of their public statements, including the praise heaped on the
CCP’s handling of the pandemic, reveal a disturbing willingness to ignore
science and alternative credible sources. While we do not know everything that
happened at the WHO, we do know that Director-General Tedros actively engaged
in an effort to defend the CCP’s leadership from criticism, negatively
impacting the world’s understanding of the virus and hampering the global
response effort.
The
WHO has repeatedly published incomplete information that has been exploited by the
CCP to further their propaganda and disinformation efforts. The December 31st,
2019 entry in the WHO’s official timeline of the COVID-19 pandemic reads: “Wuhan
Municipal Health Commission, China, reported a cluster of cases of pneumonia in
Wuhan, Hubei Province.”173
The
press release issued by the WHO on January 5, 2020 states that “the WHO China
Country Office was informed of cases of pneumonia of unknown etiology (unknown
cause) detected in Wuhan City, Hubei Province of China.”174
Conveniently,
it leaves out the fact that the WHO China Country Office was “informed” by the
WHO headquarters in Geneva – not PRC health authorities.
These
were not isolated incidents in the early days of the pandemic. Neither document
has been updated to reflect what we know now is true – the PRC did not notify
the WHO about the outbreak. Director-General Tedros continues to make public
comments that defend the CCP’s handling of the outbreak and allude to the CCP
as the source that notified the WHO. During an April 20, 2020 press conference,
Dr. Ryan and Director-General Tedros were asked about Taiwan’s email
notification. Dr. Ryan, as quoted earlier in this report, reveals that the WHO
learned about the outbreak not from PRC authorities, but from a post on a
U.S.-based website. When the moderator called on another reporter,
Director-General Tedros interjected:
Can I? I think Mike answered it very well but
it[sic] just wanted to summarise. In its email on 31st December one thing that
has to be clear is the first email was not from Taiwan. Many other countries
already were asking for clarification. The first report came from Wuhan, from
China itself…. So the report first came from China - that’s fact number one
[emphasis added] - from Wuhan itself.175
While
it is technically true that the first reports of the virus originated in Wuhan,
WHO headquarters staff initially discovered these reports on a U.S.-based early
warning website. Director-General Tedros’ comments seem to suggest that Wuhan
or the PRC informed the WHO of the outbreak, which is untrue. These comments
are not an isolated incident, and when
173 “WHO Timeline - COVID-19.” World Health
Organization, www.who.int/news-room/detail/27-04-2020-who-timeline---covid-19
174 “Pneumonia of Unknown Cause – China.” World
Health Organization, World Health Organization, 5 Jan. 2020,
www.who.int/csr/don/05-january-2020-pneumonia-of-unkown-cause-china/en/
175 Remarks by Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus,
Director-General of the WHO, at “COVID-19 Virtual Press Conference,” April 20,
2020,
https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/transcripts/who-audio-emergencies-coronavirus-press-conference-20apr2020.pdf
combined
with the examples above, they illustrate an ongoing effort by WHO’s leadership
to use language that is technically not false but misleading to outside
audiences.
The
CCP has exploited this lack of transparency to push their propaganda,
disinformation, and revisionist history. One example, published by the China
Daily, asserts that the CCP “reported [the outbreak] in a timely fashion to the
World Health Organization.”176 Multiple news sources have repeated this claim:
“The
first cases were reported to the World Health Organization on December 31…”177
(CNN, published January 23, 2020).
Dec.
31: China tells the World Health Organization’s China office about the cases of
an unknown illness.178 (Axios, published March 18, 2020)
December
31, 2019 - Chinese Health officials inform the WHO about a cluster of 41
patients with a mysterious pneumonia.179 (Business Insider, published May 22,
2020).
On
December 31, 2019, Chinese authorities contacted the Beijing office of the
World Health Organization and informed them about an outbreak of pneumonia of
unknown origin observed in late December.180 (In-Depth News, published May 25,
2020)
On
December 31 last year, China alerted the WHO to several cases of unusual
pneumonia in Wuhan, a city of 11 million people.181 (Al Jazeera, published June
2, 2020)
Several
of these articles cite various WHO publications as proof. A lack of transparency
in the information the WHO has made public, combined with Director-General
Tedros’ public comments praising the CCP, has led to multiple news sources
inaccurately stating as fact that the PRC notified the WHO about the outbreak.
The WHO has been complicit in the spread and normalization of CCP propaganda
and disinformation.
There
was public reporting, credible warnings from outside sources, and reports from
WHO teams on the ground that differed from the CCP’s talking points. According
to outside experts,
176 “Experts Say It’s Groundless to Hold China
Accountable for COVID-19.” China Daily,
www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202006/04/WS5ed832f8a310a8b24115ab5a.html
177 Cohen, Elizabeth. “CDC Advisers Concerned about
Lack of Basic Information about New Wuhan Coronavirus.”
CNN, 23 Jan. 2020,
www.cnn.com/2020/01/23/health/wuhan-coronavirus-cdc-advisers/index.html
178 Allen-Ebrahimian
179 Holly Secon, Aylin Woodward. “A Comprehensive
Timeline of the New Coronavirus Pandemic, from China’s First Case to the
Present.” Business Insider, 22 May 2020,
www.businessinsider.com/coronavirus-pandemic-timeline-history-major-events-2020-3
180 “COVID-19: How the U.S. Ignored the Chinese and
WHO Warnings.” InDepthNews, 25 May 2020,
www.indepthnews.net/index.php/opinion/3566-covid-19-how-the-u-s-ignored-the-chinese-and-who-warnings
181 “Timeline: How the New Coronavirus Spread.” Al
Jazeera, 2 June 2020,
www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/01/timeline-china-coronavirus-spread-200126061554884.html
the
WHO’s public statements were “heavily influenced by the Chinese Communist
Party.”182 By repeating as truth statements that were misleading, if not lies,
the WHO negatively impacted the global response. Lawrence Gostin, a professor
of global health at Georgetown University who consults with the WHO, stated
that he and other global health experts were “deceived”183 by the statements
made by the CCP and WHO.184
Unfortunately,
it is clear that Director-General Tedros was not prepared for this pandemic and
did not base his decisions on the available scientific evidence. A further
investigation into the full extent of the CCP’s influence at the WHO and the
WHO’s tragic handling is fully warranted, but also fully challenged by the lack
of information from the WHO and CCP. A key example of this surrounds the
confirmation that SARS-CoV-2 was spreading by human-to-human transmission. On
January 13th, a news release by the WHO regarding the confirmation of a
COVID-19 case in Thailand, read in part, “there has been no suggestion of
human-to-human transmission.”185
On
January 14th, the WHO issued a “disease outbreak news” release that stated, “based
on the available information, there is no clear evidence of human-to-human
transmission.”186
On
January 21st, China’s National Health Commission finally conceded that
human-to-human transmission was occurring. The next day, the WHO published a
report from its China field office that confirmed that human-to-human
transmission was occurring.187
Despite
repeated claims by the WHO before January 22nd that there was no “suggestion”
or evidence of human-to human transmission, on April 13th, WHO’s COVID-19
Technical Lead, Dr. Maria Van Kerkhove, said:
Right from the start, from the first notification we
received on the 31st of December, given that this was a cluster of pneumonia —
I’m a MERS specialist, so my background is in coronaviruses and influenza — so
immediately thought, given that this is a respiratory pathogen, that of course
there may be human-to-human transmission.188
It
is hard to reconcile the WHO’s own Technical Lead saying that on December 31st
she knew that “of course” human-to-human transmission could be occurring with
the WHO’s January 13th statement that “there has been no suggestion of
human-to-human
182 Feldwisch-Drentrup, Hinnerk. “How WHO Became
China’s Coronavirus Accomplice.” Foreign Policy, 2 Apr. 2020,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/02/china-coronavirus-who-health-soft-power/
183 Rauhala, Emily. “Chinese Officials Note Serious
Problems in Coronavirus Response. The World Health Organization Keeps Praising
Them.” The Washington Post, 9 Feb. 2020,
www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/chinese-officials-note-serious-problems-in-coronavirus-response-the-world-health-organization-keeps-praising-them/2020/02/08/b663dd7c-4834-11ea-91ab-ce439aa5c7c1_story.html
184 Ibid.
185 “Thailand Responding to the Novel Coronavirus.”
World Health Organization, 13 Jan. 2020,
www.who.int/thailand/news/detail/13-01-2020-thailand-responding-to-the-novel-coronavirus
186 “Novel Coronavirus – Thailand (Ex-China).” World
Health Organization, 16 Jan. 2020,
www.who.int/csr/don/14-january-2020-novel-coronavirus-thailand-ex-china/en/
187 “Mission Summary: WHO Field Visit to Wuhan,
China 20-21 January 2020.” World Health Organization, 22 Jan. 2020,
www.who.int/china/news/detail/22-01-2020-field-visit-wuhan-china-jan-2020
188 “Live from WHO Headquarters - coronavirus -
COVID-19 daily press briefing 13 April 2020.” YouTube, uploaded by the World
Health Organization, 13 Apr. 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NCy-qvcDDl4
transmission.”
Either the WHO willfully ignored their experts, or they deferred to CCP
pressure.
This
deference continued after the declaration of a PHEIC. After the United States
instituted travel restrictions on January 31st, Director-General Tedros said
travel restrictions “unnecessarily interfere with international travel and
trade.”189 This is despite the millions of Chinese citizens traveling abroad
for the Spring Festival190
and
Director-General Tedros’ repeated praise of the CCP’s response to COVID-19,
which included travel restrictions, both internationally and domestically. As
China continued to report small numbers of new cases, the WHO delayed declaring
COVID-19 a pandemic until March 11th, despite the virus spreading globally
weeks before.191
It
was only after 114 countries reported a total of more than 120,000 cases that
the WHO finally acknowledged the scale of the outbreak and declared it a
pandemic.192
Those
who seek to defend the WHO’s handling of the response argue that had the WHO
been more aggressive in seeking transparency from the CCP, it would have
exacerbated efforts to hide information and impeded the global response.193
The
CCP’s abject failures to abide by its international obligations do not excuse
the failures of the WHO leadership to fulfil the organization’s mandate to
investigate and respond to global health emergencies. The answer is not to
excuse a weakened WHO, but to hold a guilty CCP accountable.
Outstanding
Questions Regarding SARS-CoV-2 and COVID-19
Despite
the large amount of information suppressed by the CCP that has now become
public, there remains a litany of questions to be answered, not only by the
CCP, but by the WHO as well.
Questions
for the CCP
The
CCP has refused to allow outside experts to visit the Wuhan Institute of
Virology and has refused to allow the WIV to send virus samples to the WHO or
its Member States.
Outstanding
questions regarding the CCP’s handling out of the outbreak include:
-Why
did the CCP not notify the WHO of the outbreak in Wuhan as required by Article
6 of the IHR?
189 Nebehay, Stephanie. “WHO Chief Says Widespread
Travel Bans Not Needed to Beat China Virus.” Reuters, 3 Feb. 2020,
www.reuters.com/article/us-china-health-who/who-chief-says-widespread-travel-bans-not-needed-to-beat-china-virus-idUSKBN1ZX1H3
190 “China Will Rack Up Three Billion Trips During
World’s Biggest Human Migration.” Bloomberg, 20 Jan. 2020,
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-01-20/china-readies-for-world-s-biggest-human-migration-quicktake
191 Feldwisch-Drentrup, Hinnerk. “How WHO Became
China’s Coronavirus Accomplice.” Foreign Policy, 2 Apr. 2020,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/02/china-coronavirus-who-health-soft-power/
192 Siemaszko, Corky. “Coronavirus Outbreak Labeled
a Pandemic by World Health Organization.” NBC News, 11 Mar. 2020,
www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/coronavirus-outbreak-labeled-pandemic-world-health-organization-n1155741
193 Rauhala, Emily. “Chinese Officials Note Serious
Problems in Coronavirus Response. The World Health Organization Keeps Praising
Them.” The Washington Post, 9 Feb. 2020,
www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/chinese-officials-note-serious-problems-in-coronavirus-response-the-world-health-organization-keeps-praising-them/2020/02/08/b663dd7c-4834-11ea-91ab-ce439aa5c7c1_story.html
-Why
did the CCP’s not notify the WHO that Chinese researchers had identified the
virus as a coronavirus genetically similar to SARS-CoV?
-Why
did the CCP delay, by 13 days, the announcement that it had identified the
virus responsible for the outbreak and that it was a novel coronavirus
genetically similar to SARS-CoV?
-Why
did the CCP delay releasing the genetic sequence of the virus by ten days?
-Why
did the CCP require laboratories and research sites across China to destroy
their samples of the virus?
-Has
the CCP identified patient zero?
-Were
samples gathered from the Huanan market prior to it being sanitized?
-If
so, why were those samples not shared with the WHO and the international
community?
-Why
has the CCP refused to share primary isolates of SARS-CoV-2 with the WHO and
the international community?
-Why
did the CCP intervene and prohibit the WIV from transferring samples to the lab
at the University of Texas medical branch in Galveston?
-Was
gain-of-function research being conducted on wild coronavirus strains at the
WIV immediately prior to the outbreak?
-Why
did the CCP impose restrictions on the publication of academic research on the
origins of SARS-CoV-2?
-What
is the current status of Chen Quishi and Fang Bin, the missing journalists? Questions
for the WHO
Similarly,
there are multiple outstanding questions for Director-General Tedros and the
WHO:
-When
did the WHO first learn that the outbreak in Wuhan was caused by a coronavirus
similar to the virus that caused the 2003 SARS pandemic?
-When
did the WHO first confirm that human-to-human transmission was occurring?
-Did
the WHO seek verification of Taiwan’s reports of SARS cases and ongoing
human-to-human transmission in accordance with Article 9? If not, why not?
-If
so, did the Government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) comply?
-If
the PRC did not comply, why did the WHO not transmit that information to Member
States in accordance with Article 10?
-Why
did the WHO not transmit the information provided by Taiwan to WHO Member
States in accordance with Article 11?
-Has
the WHO received similar emails from Taiwan in the past? If so, how were they
handled?
-Did
the WHO investigate the warnings, in accordance with Article 9, from Dr. Ho, a
member of the WHO Collaborating Centre for Infection Disease Epidemiology and
Control at the University of Hong Kong, regarding the high likelihood that
human-to-human transmission was already occurring? If not, why not?
-If so, did the Government of the PRC comply?
-Does
the WHO consider viral isolates and genetic sequencing data “public health
information” under Article 6?
-Has
the WHO requested live virus samples from the PRC? If so, has the PRC provided
said samples?
-When
did the WHO become aware of reports that the PRC was suppressing public health
information in violation of Articles 6 and 7?
-After
becoming aware, did Director-General Tedros request an explanation from the
CCP?
-Who
were the “select team members” of the WHO-China Joint Mission who were allowed
access to Wuhan?
-What
actions has the WHO taken in response to the PRC’s violations of the 2005 IHR?
-Has
the WHO ever taken action against a State Party in response to violations of
the IHR?
-What
new information was available to Director-General Tedros on January 31st, when
he declared a PHEIC, that was not publicly reported on January 23rd?
-Was
the WHO told, or made to feel, that the WHO’s access to data, information, and
access to potential sites in Wuhan, China was contingent on cooperating with
the CCP’s narrative of events?
Each
of these questions represent information that we need to better understand the
source and cause of the COVID-19 global pandemic. It is our hope that in the
coming weeks and months, the world will learn the answers to these questions.
As such, on May 8, 2020, we transmitted the above questions to the WHO. To
date, we have not received a response. Future versions of this report will
include any responses we receive.
Recommendations
The
full impact of the COVID-19 global pandemic will not be known for years to
come. In the coming months we will struggle with questions regarding strains on
our healthcare systems, peak caseloads, subsequent waves of new infections, and
the impact of secondary and tertiary effects on the domestic and global
economies in addition to our national security. However, there are steps that
can be taken now. Given the current status of the COVID-19 pandemic, it seems
likely that the global response will continue for the foreseeable future. As
such, it is important the international community take steps to restore
legitimacy to the WHO so the rest of the response will not be tainted by their
prior missteps and so we are best prepared for the next dangerous outbreak.
Each
action the United States takes in the international community must be aimed at
supporting accountability, transparency, and reforms to the systems and
processes that enabled the CCP’s cover-up and the WHO’s failures. To this end,
we provide three recommendations: new leadership at the WHO, that the United
States engage in an international investigation with likeminded WHO Member
States regarding the early stages of COVID-19, and concrete reforms to the International
Health Regulations.
New
Leadership at WHO
It
is clear Director-General Tedros seriously erred in his handling of the
COVID-19 pandemic. Coupled with a concerning history of covering up outbreaks
of cholera in his home country of Ethiopia and repeated delays in declaring a
PHEIC in response to the Kivu Ebola epidemic, we believe there is an
established pattern of poor decision making and political deference that has
weakened the ability of the WHO to fulfill its mandate. We do not expect, nor
require, the head of the WHO to be perfect. However, Director-General Tedros
has repeatedly defended his decisions, responded to Taiwan’s criticism by
accusing their government of supporting racists,194 and praised the CCP’s
deplorable actions in response to the outbreak.
Defenders
of Director-General Tedros argue that it would have been counterproductive to
push back against the CCP. They argue that “diplomatic flatter is the price of
ensuring Chinese cooperation.”195 Others say that the Director-General “cannot
afford to antagonize the notoriously touchy Chinese government.”196 These
statements rest on the claim that if Director-General Tedros been more
aggressive in questioning the claims coming from the CCP, then the CCP would
have shared less information or delayed WHO access to the country.
However,
such defenses ring hollow when the world has seen the impact of an independent
Director-General of the WHO. In April 2003, two months after the CCP finally
reported the outbreak of SARS to the WHO, and in the midst of the WHO response,
then-Director-General Gro Harlem Brundtland publicly commented on the CCP’s
mishandling of the outbreak.
Director-General
Brundlant criticized the failure of the CCP to report the outbreak and their
lack of coordination with the international community.197 Under her leadership
the WHO declared a travel guidance for the first time in 55 years in order to
stem the spread of SARS.198 Almost prophetically, Director-General Brundlant
stated:
When I say that it would have been better, it means
that I’m saying as the director general of the World Health Organisation: next
time something strange and new comes anywhere in the world let us come in as
quickly as possible.199
Tragically,
the CCP failed to heed her guidance. Director-General Brundlant’s handling of
the 2003 SARS pandemic is a case study for the importance of a Director-General
who speaks truth to power and publicly challenges Member States when they fail
to uphold their obligations to the international community. Instead,
Director-General Tedros has
194 “Coronavirus: WHO Chief and Taiwan in Row over ‘Racist’
Comments.” BBC News, 9 Apr. 2020, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-52230833
195 Borger, Julian. “Caught in a Superpower
Struggle: the inside Story of the WHO’s Response to Coronavirus.” The Guardian,
18 Apr. 2020,
www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/18/caught-in-a-superpower-struggle-the-inside-story-of-the-whos-response-to-coronavirus
196 Griffiths, James. “WHO’s Relationship with China
under Scrutiny Due to Coronavirus Crisis.” CNN, 17 Feb. 2020,
www.cnn.com/2020/02/14/asia/coronavirus-who-china-intl-hnk/index.html
197 “Health | China under Fire for Virus Spread.”
BBC News, 6 Apr. 2003, www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/2922993.stm
198 Collins, Michael. “The WHO and China:
Dereliction of Duty.” Council on Foreign Relations, 27 Feb. 2020,
www.cfr.org/blog/who-and-china-dereliction-duty
199 “Health | China under Fire for Virus Spread.”
BBC News, 6 Apr. 2003, www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/2922993.stm
chosen
to defend and heap praise on a Member State who has continuously fed the WHO
lies and misinformation.
As
such, we have lost faith in the ability of Director-General Tedros to lead the
WHO. Having presided over two flawed PHEIC responses and prevented Taiwan from
engaging with the WHO, it is clear that Director-General Tedros prioritizes
matters other than the on-the-ground impact of COVID-19. The WHO’s constitution
requires it to provide “appropriate technical assistance,”200
not
political coverage for mistakes and cover-ups carried out by Member States. As
Director-General, the responsibility of declaring a PHEIC, and indeed, the
impact of choosing not to declare one, rests on his shoulders. In order to
restore the faith of WHO Member States and return the WHO to its mandate of
providing accurate, technical advice, Director-General Tedros should accept
responsibility for his detrimental impact on the COVID-19 response and resign.
The health of the world cannot afford incompetence and poor management.
International
Investigation
The
United States should engage with likeminded WHO Member States and Taiwan on an
international investigation of the CCP’s cover-up of the early stages of the
pandemic and the WHO’s failure to fulfill its obligations under the IHR. Such
an investigation should seek to establish a definitive account of the origins
of SARS-CoV-2, its appearance in humans, efforts by the CCP to conceal relevant
scientific and health information about the outbreak, the effect of the CCP’s
cover-up on the actions of the WHO, the impact of the WHO’s parroting of CCP
propaganda, and the influence of the CCP’s cover-up on the global response.
Fortunately,
we are not alone in this proposal. The Governments of Australia, Japan, New
Zealand, Sweden, and Taiwan, in addition to the European Commission, have
publicly expressed their support for an independent investigation of the
pandemic. While the WHO failed to abide by the IHR, uphold its mandate, and
fulfil its obligations to Member States, we do not believe the withdrawal of
the United States or the establishment of a competing international
organization is the correct path forward. Instead, we believe the results of
this investigation should inform our final recommendation – reform of the
International Health Regulations and the WHO.
IHR
Reforms
In
the wake of the 2003 SARS pandemic, the United States was involved in efforts
to reform the International Health Regulations. Negotiations amongst WHO Member
States resulted in the 2005 IHR, which entered into effect in 2007. While the
2005 IHR included several important reforms, the COVID-19 pandemic has revealed
additional flaws and the need to refine previous reforms. We recommend the
President and Secretary of State use the voice, vote, and influence of the
United States to seek additional IHR reforms, including around the information
Member States are required to provide, WHO’s obligations to investigate
unofficial reports concerning health events and notify Member States, and the
process for declaring a PHEIC.
200 “Constitution.” World Health Organization,
www.who.int/about/who-we-are/constitution
Article
6 of the IHR requires Member States to provide certain relevant public health
information to the WHO, including “laboratory results,”201 among other things.
As discussed earlier in the report, the PRC failed to transmit the SARS-CoV-2
genetic sequencing data to the WHO for 10 days, and to date has not provided
viral isolates or other biological samples to the WHO. Article 6 should be amended
to include, by reference, genetic sequencing data and biological samples in the
list of public health information Member States are required to provide to the
WHO. This will ensure that Member States cannot exploit perceived loopholes to
hide or suppress vital public health information.
Under
Article 9 of the IHR, the WHO has a “mandate” 202 to investigate and seek
verification of unofficial reports concerning health events with “potential
international implication.”203 In several instances discussed in this report,
it appears that the WHO failed to do so. The United States Government should
consider how to improve and clarify WHO’s responsibilities to investigate
reports from non-Member States under Article 9. One possible option would be
requiring WHO to disclose the results of their investigations once complete.
Alternatively, the IHR could be modified to empower Member States to refer
third party or unofficial reports of activity within a different Member State
to the WHO for investigation.
Article
11 of the IHR regulates how the WHO provides information to Member States.
While the IHR mandates Member States provide certain information with 24- or
48-hours, Article 10 only requires the WHO to provide information “as soon as
possible.”204 After the Wuhan Municipal Health Commission notified the WHO of
the outbreak, it took the WHO four days to publicly report the notification on
social media and five days to issue a technical publication to the scientific
and public health communities. The IHR should be modified to require the WHO to
inform Member States of all reports and notifications received from a Member
State within 48 hours.
Finally,
Article 12 concerns the determination of a Public Health Emergency of
International Concern. While Section 4 of the Article provides a list of items
for the Director-General to consider, there is no requirement that the
Director-General heed the advice of the Emergency Committee or provide justification
of his decision to declare, or not declare, a PHEIC. We believe that the
breakdown of the PHEIC process during the Kivu Ebola epidemic and the current
COVID-19 pandemic illustrates the need to reform and formalize this process.
PHEIC decisions should be made based on scientific information and global
health best practices, not any other considerations. To this end, we recommend
reforms around the structure and authority of the Emergency Committee, as well
as the processes in Article 12, that would achieve this goal.
201 2005 IHR.
202 “Frequently Asked Questions about the
International Health Regulations (2005).” World Health Organization, 18 Aug.
2009, www.who.int/ihr/about/faq/en/
203 Ibid.
204 2005 IHR.
Conclusion
There
are still many unanswered questions as to the origins of SARS-CoV-2 and the
cause of the COVID-19 global pandemic. Almost every day, new information leaks
out of the PRC showing the scale of CCP efforts to hide and cover up the
outbreak. Director-General Tedros’ full-throated defense of the CCP’s response
and embrace of their revisionist history remains incredibly concerning.
Reflecting on what we have uncovered so far, the failures of the CCP to protect
their citizens and fulfill their obligations under international law have resulted
in disappeared journalists, a world seized by a public health emergency, and
hundreds of thousands of dead.
Senior
CCP leaders, including CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping, knew a pandemic was
ongoing weeks before it was announced. Research shows the CCP could have
reduced the number of cases in China by up to 95%, had it fulfilled its
obligations under international law and responded to the outbreak in a manner
consistent with best practices. It is highly likely the ongoing pandemic could
have been prevented. As such, it is incumbent upon the United States and
likeminded WHO Member States to ensure the accountability and reforms necessary
to prevent the CCP’s malfeasance from giving rise to a third pandemic during
the 21st century.
Appendix
Timeline of Key Events in the Chinese Communist
Party’s Cover-up
December 2019 – January 2020: CCP leaders know about
coronavirus, but take aggressive steps to hide it from the public, including
detaining doctors who warned about the virus and censoring media on the virus.
Dec. 30, 2019: Doctors in Wuhan report positive
tests for “SARS Coronavirus” to Wuhan health officials. Under WHO regulations,
China is required to report these results within 24 hours.
China fails to inform the WHO about the outbreak.
Dec 31, 2019: WHO officials in Geneva become aware
of media reports regarding an outbreak in Wuhan and directs the WHO China
Country Office to investigate. Taiwan informs WHO about human-to-human
transmission, but data is not published on WHO’s data exchange platform.
Jan 1, 2020: Hubei Provincial Health Commission
official orders gene sequencing companies and labs who had already determined
the novel virus was similar to SARS to stop testing and to destroy existing
samples.
Jan 2, 2020: The Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV)
completes gene sequencing of the virus, but the CCP does not share the sequence
or inform the WHO.
Jan 3, 2020: China’s National Health Commission
ordered institutions not to publish any information related to the “unknown
disease” and ordered labs to transfer samples to CCP controlled national
institutions or destroy them.
Mid-Late January: Despite knowing about the virus,
CCP allowed massive travel within China and abroad during the Spring Festival
(3 billion estimated trips over 40 days), and Wuhan held a celebratory potluck
with more than 40,000 families eating from 14,000 dishes
Jan 11-12, 2020: After a researcher in Shanghai
leaks the gene sequence online, the CCP transmits the WIV’s gene sequencing
information to the WHO that was completed 10 days earlier. The Shanghai lab
where the researcher works is ordered to close.
Jan 14, 2020: Wuhan health authorities claim no
human to human transmission from coronavirus. This assessment was tweeted by
WHO the same day. According to classified documents obtained by the Associated
Press, Xi Jinping is warned by top Chinese health official that a pandemic is
occurring.
Jan 22, 2020: WHO mission to China admits some
evidence of human-to-human transmission.
Jan 23, 2020: After the Emergency Committee is
divided on whether to declare a Public Health Emergency of International
Concern (PHEIC), Director-General Tedros decides not to. This delay contributed
to a regional epidemic turning into a pandemic
Jan 23, 2020: The CCP institutes a city-wide
lockdown of Wuhan. However, before the lockdown goes into effect, an estimated
5 million people leave the city.
Jan 29, 2020: Tedros praises the CCP’s response to
the virus, saying their transparency was “very impressive, and beyond words”
and that the CCP was “actually setting a new standard for outbreak response.”
Jan 30, 2020: One week after declining to do so,
Tedros declares a Public Health Emergency of International Concern.
Feb 16, 2020: WHO and PRC officials begin a nine-day
“WHO-China Joint Mission on Coronavirus Disease 2019” and travel to China to
examine the outbreak and origin of COVID-
19. Many team members, including at least one
American, were not allowed to visit Wuhan on the trip.
March 11, 2020: The WHO officially declares the
COVID-19 outbreak a pandemic after 114 countries had already reported 118,000
cases including more than 1,000 in the United States.
[Laboratory
Results shared by Dr. Ai Denoting a Positive Test for “SARS coronavirus”]
[Screenshot
of Dr. Li’s Messages Regarding Positive SARS Tests]
[Letter
Signed by Dr. Li Under Coercion from Wuhan Public Security Bureau]
[Annex
2 of the 2005 International Health Regulations]
[Letter
to World Health Organization Director-General Tedros on Outstanding Questions]
